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Abstract 
The recent Global Financial Crisis provides a great opportunity to study banking mergers, 
especially ones with failed targets and government assistance. In our study, we adopt multiple 
approaches to study two main questions. First, we are interested to learn if mergers lead to real 
economic synergies for combined entities using operating measures. We adopt Propensity Score 
Matching to compare failed bank acquirers to their close peers. Results show that acquirers in 
regulatory mergers experience significant improvements in both profitability and cost efficiency 
immediately after the merger transaction. In addition, we are interested in learning whether 
participation in a failed bank auction benefits a participant even when this participant is not 
eventually chosen as the acquirer. Our theory is that participation in the auction reduces 
information asymmetry and improves the credibility of the participant, a phenomena we call the 
“Certification Effect”. Traditional event study methodology is applied and results show that 
acquirers in regulatory mergers tend to experience significantly positive market reaction, which 
is rationalized by their outperformance in operation. More interesting, we find that the market 
reaction to first time participation in failed bank auctions is significantly higher than the market 
reaction to the announcement of participation by an experienced participant. This result holds for 
both the successful or unsuccessful bidder groups.  
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1. Introduction 
The 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis started a completely new chapter for the entire world. 
Countless numbers of businesses globally were impacted. At the center of this economic storm, 
the U.S. banking industry experienced the worst 4-year period (08-11) of weak business 
conditions and had one of the biggest industry-wide reshuffles in history. During the period of 
2008 to 2013, a total of 2022 mergers and acquisitions (hereafter M&As) occurred within the 
sector, of which 1448 cases took place between 2008 and 2011.
1
 
Numerous studies have been devoted to investigate M&As in the banking industry and aimed to 
learn about these mergers for factors varying from the characteristics of the involved banks, 
impacts of the resolution mechanism, and market perceptions to motivation and outcomes. 
Regular merger
2
 studies usually exclude mergers that are assisted by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), or at least do not distinguish them from non-assisted transactions 
as they are relatively rare during normal economic periods. Because of the recent financial crisis, 
however, a significant number of mergers were done through FDIC assistance during a short 
amount of time. This provides a great opportunity for us to look into this special group of 
mergers, hereafter, regulatory mergers. Within the regulatory merger group, a majority of them 
were sold to a healthier peer through FDIC failed bank auctions while only a small portion were 
kept by the FDIC itself and were eventually liquidated
3
. Among that 1448 M&As completed 
during the period of 2008 to 2011, there are only 401 regulatory mergers accomplished with 
FDIC assistance. These special M&As are characterized by official bankruptcy of targets, closed 
                                                          
1
 These counts are at individual bank level. M&As at Bank Holding Company levels, with BHCs 
either as a target or an acquirer, are not included in this count, neither in our following studies. 
2
 In our study, “regular mergers”, “non-assisted mergers” and “non-regulatory mergers” are 
interchangeable, and “non-regular”, “assisted mergers” and “regulatory mergers” are 
interchangeable. 
3
 In these cases, the FDIC failed to find another financial institution to take over the failed 
targets. Therefore, the FDIC would simply pay back all insured deposits through mail while 
keeping all the target’s assets for later deposition. All loan customers, requested by the FDIC, 
should continue to make their payments as usual with no changes made to their loan terms. 
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auction with sealed bidding, cash-only method of payment, and most important, involvement of 
the FDIC as both an insurer and a partner
4
. 
There are quite a few studies in the banking literature focusing purely on failed bank mergers 
from market reaction perspective. Contrary to almost unanimous findings discussed in non-
regulatory M&As literature of which acquirers are often found to experience winner’s curse, 
failed bank merger studies have two sides of findings. One side of the literature argues for 
evidences of negative abnormal returns experienced by acquirers with overbidding hypothesis 
(Pettway and Trifts, 1985; Giliberto and Varaiya, 1989; Zhang, 1997) while the other side of the 
literature argues that acquirers are found to experience significantly positive market reaction 
around merger announcement date with underbidding and wealth transfer hypothesis (James and 
Wier, 1987; Bertin et al., 1989; Cochran et al., 1995; Christoffersen et al., 2012; Loveland, 2012; 
Cowan and Salotti, 2013). The former group argues that bidders in failed bank auctions would 
tend to overbid, much like what would happen in a general auction, and thus experience winners’ 
curse. The latter group, however, found evidences suggesting underbidding for reasons such as 
reduced overall purchase power of survivor banks during financial crisis, fire sales of failed 
banks due to increased supplies, and information asymmetry faced by potential bidders. In 
particular, Christoffersen et al. (2012) claimed that the FDIC’s pricing power is impaired during 
financial crisis and thus wealth is expropriated from the FDIC by winning acquirers through 
underbidding. These studies also suggest that such a positive gain for acquirers, not surprisingly, 
is negatively related to bidding competitions. 
From operating performance perspective, studies are usually conducted at a more general level. 
With variations of proxies, quite a few studies documented positive improvement in operating 
performances for combined banks (Cornett and Tehranian, 1992; Knapp et al., 2006; DeLong 
                                                          
4
 According to its own website: 1. As an insurer, “the FDIC typically will reimburse 80 percent 
of losses incurred by the acquirer on covered assets up to a stated threshold amount (generally 
the FDIC's dollar estimate of the total projected losses on loss share assets), with the assuming 
bank absorbing 20 percent”; 2. As a partner, “if there are recoveries on assets that have been 
charged off by the failed bank or the assuming bank, then the FDIC receives the majority of the 
benefit. The assuming bank will reimburse the FDIC for 80 percent of the recoveries”; 3. 
Covering period for losses and benefits sharing varies for commercial assets and residential 
mortgages. More detailed information could be found at 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/lossshare/. 
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and DeYoung, 2007; Al-Sharkas et al., 2008). Cornett and Tehraninan found evidence of 
improved operating cash flow while DeLong and DeYoung (2007) found additional evidence of 
improvements in other aspects (discussed in literature review). Both studies also found a positive 
reaction in equity markets for merged banks rationalizing the results from operating performance 
tests. Knapp et al. (2006), however, failed to document the positive correlation between real 
economic synergy and market reaction even though they did find evidence of improvement in 
accounting performance from five different aspects. 
Building on the previous knowledge, we are mainly interested in two questions in this study. 
First, we analyze regulatory mergers from the operating aspect. We would like to find out 
whether or not these mergers make economic sense. Specifically, we like to answer the question 
of whether acquiring a failed peer bank would allow the acquirer bank to achieve better 
operating performance. We analyze profitability (ROA) and cost efficiency (Cost-Income Ratio) 
as two performance measures, and we adopt the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method to 
study changes in the performance of the acquirers. By focusing on a filtered merger sample
5
 for 
the period of 2008 to 2011, our findings suggest that regulatory merger acquirers in general tend 
to experience improvements in both profitability and cost-income efficiency, especially for 
transactions done in later years of the period. While improvement in cost-income efficiency is 
robust and consistent, advancement in profitability is weaker and sensitive to matching 
methodologies. When comparing these results to those of non-regulatory merger acquirers, more 
distinct but interesting results show that acquirers of regulatory mergers outperformed their 
counterparties from non-regulatory mergers quite substantially, both compared to their close 
matches. In particular, acquirers of regulatory mergers done in 2009, 2010 or 2011 experienced 
significant improvements in both profitability and cost-income efficiency for at least 2 years 
following the merger transaction
6
, while acquirers of non-regulatory mergers experienced almost 
no improvements in either performance measurements throughout the entire study period. 
                                                          
5
 This M&As sample is filtered for Propensity Score Matching. All cases remained are the ones 
such that this underlying merger transaction is associated acquirer's only merger transaction 
during the [-2Y, +2Y] window. More discussions on this could be found in data and 
methodology section. 
6
 Robustness check, with [-3Y,+3Y] window, also shows that improvements in both synergy 
measures for merger deals done in 2009 and 2010 also extended to the third year following the 
transaction. 
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The second interest of ours is from market perspective. We would like to find out how investors 
perceive and react to failed bank mergers and more important we would like to test the 
“Certification Effect” in the FDIC failed bank auction. We adopt the basic event study 
methodology and the results from these tests show that acquirers of regulatory mergers in general 
experienced significantly positive reactions from equity investors around merger announcement 
date (same as closing date in regulatory merger cases), equaling to 3.53% for 0 to +1 day 
window. Sorting full sample into first time failed bank auction participants and senior 
participants shows 4.33% and 2.44% abnormal returns respectively.
7
 Results from testing market 
reaction on release of unsuccessful bidder information indicate that first time failed bank auction 
participants, without actually winning the case, still experienced 1.41% abnormal return on 
average around 0 to +1 window. Thus, combining results from tests of both actual acquirers and 
unsuccessful bidders support our hypothesis of Certification Effect. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In section 2 and 3, we review the general 
process of the failed bank resolution and the relevant literatures respectively. Section 4 develops 
our hypotheses and section 5 contains a description of the data and sample filtering process. Our 
methodology and empirical results are discussed in section 6 and section 7 respectively. Then 
section 8 concludes. 
  
                                                          
7
 We sort acquirers based on their experience with the FDIC failed bank auction (between 2007 
and 2013), including both successful and unsuccessful bidding experiences. For example, an 
acquirer would be classified as a senior participant as long as it participated in an earlier auction; 
even it was not chosen by the FDIC as a winner at the end. 
5 
 
2. What Happens If an Insured Bank Fails8 
Federal or state banking regulatory agencies will consider an insured bank to be in financial 
distress if the bank is critically undercapitalized (having a ratio of tangible equity to total assets 
equal to or less than 2 percent) without a feasible plan to restore capital to the required level or 
the bank cannot keep up with deposit outflows. Facing the impending failure of an insured bank 
the chartering authority of the failing bank will notify the FDIC through a “failing bank letter”. 
The FDIC then, required by law, will prepare an arrangement to dissolve the failing institution so 
that it would minimize the total cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). 
In general, the FDIC has three basic ways of dissolving a failing bank, known as open bank 
assistance, deposit payoff, and close bank assistance. Under the open bank assistance scenario, 
the FDIC will provide the failing bank with necessary assistance (make loans to, purchase the 
assets of, or place deposits in the troubled bank) to maintain its operation and expects to be 
compensated for the assistance provided whenever possible. However, this mechanism of 
resolving a failing bank has become less efficient as there are new policies passed
9
 and it is often 
criticized for potentially creating Too-Big-To-Fail banks. Therefore, this method has rarely been 
used since 1992. Under the deposit payoff scenario, the FDIC will use the Deposit Insurance 
Fund to pay off insured deposits of the failing bank in full amounts and maintain its assets for 
later disposal. Depositors with remaining uninsured deposits and other creditors of the failing 
bank will be granted receivership certificates from the FDIC entitling them to proceeds from 
later liquidations of the failing bank’s assets.  
The closed bank assistance strategy is often found to be more favorable by the FDIC in resolving 
failing banks. This strategy is done through the Purchasing & Assumption (P&A) Agreement in 
which a healthier bank agrees to purchase some, or all, of the failing bank’s assets while 
                                                          
8
 Information presented in this section is primarily based on “Managing the crisis: the FDIC and 
RTC experience 1980-1994” published by Washington, D.C.: Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation in 1998 as well as the FDIC’s website at 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/ 
9
 FDIC (1998) stated that “Passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act (FIRREA) in 1989 repealed many of the potential tax benefits associated with 
open bank assistance” and “The Competitive Equality Banking Act (CEBA) of 1987 authorized 
the FDIC to establish a bridge bank, which allowed the FDIC additional time to find a permanent 
solution for resolving a failing bank”. 
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assuming some, or all, of the failing bank’s liabilities, including all insured deposits. After being 
notified for the impending failure of an insured bank and appointed as the receiver, the FDIC 
will start its resolution process by requesting business and financial information from the failing 
bank, and sending a team of specialists to perform further on-site analysis in order to prepare an 
information package to give to potential buyers of this failing bank. Concurrently, the FDIC will 
perform due diligence to estimate disposal value of all assets and potential costs associated with 
direct deposit payoff on a discounted future cash flow basis. With all this information, the FDIC 
will then decide on structures of a potential P&A agreement. 
After all preparations, the FDIC will begin its confidential marketing of the failing bank to as 
many qualified potential buyers as possible and invite them to the following failed bank auction. 
An important aspect of this auction is that it is a closed form auction. The FDIC will take the 
initiative to screen for qualifications
10
 and only banks with an invitation could participate in the 
auction. All approved potential buyers will be invited to an information session where the 
information package will be distributed and potential offers are discussed. Following this 
session, they are given some time to conduct their own due diligence, estimate the price they are 
willing to pay for the failed bank assets, and submit sealed bids. “A bid has two parts: One 
amount, called the premium, is for the franchise value of the failed institution’s deposits; the 
second amount is what the bidder is willing to pay for the institution’s assets to be acquired.” 
The final cash settlement to or from the FDIC for each winning bid would be calculated as 
liabilities assumed minus assets purchase and then subtract agreed premiums on deposits 
acquired. 
Once all bids are gathered, the FDIC will pool them together along with its own estimated cost of 
direct deposit payoff as the minimum bid level accepted and select the least cost
11
 bid, regardless 
                                                          
10
 The FDIC takes into account geographic location, competitive environment, minority owned 
status, overall financial condition, asset size, capital level, and regulatory ratings when screening 
for qualified buyers. 
11
 “The least cost is terminology used by the FDIC to refer to the bid alternative for a failing 
institution in which the total amount of the FDIC’s expenditures and obligations incurred is the 
least costly to the deposit insurance fund of all possible resolutions for that failed institution.” 
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of other factors.
12
 Once the winning bidder is selected and approved by the FDIC Board of 
Directors, the FDIC will close the failing bank, transfer all assumed liabilities and purchased 
assets to the acquirer while maintaining the remaining liabilities and assets if any. Upon 
completion of this process, the FDIC will make a public announcement regarding both the 
closure of the failing bank and the final resolution method adopted (which means the merger 
announcement date and the actual merger close date are essentially the same in failed bank 
mergers). The entire resolution process generally lasts 90 to 100 days and should be kept 
confidential by all parties until the FDIC officially makes the announcement itself. 
On November 12
th
, 2009, the FDIC Board of Director determined that the FDIC would also 
disclose bid summary information to the public for all whole-bank transactions and assets sales 
taking place subsequent to May 2009 in addition to the announcement of the failed bank merger 
agreement. An example of a bid summary released is shown in Figure 1. Specifically, the FDIC 
will provide information regarding the names of bidders and bid amounts for both winning and 
losing bids, and the general methodology for determining the least costly bid. The disclosure of 
the losing bids usually takes the FDIC days or even weeks after the announcement of the 
winning bid, with the exception of the cover bid (the second highest bid received by the FDIC)  
which has one year moratorium to avoid impairment of the FDIC’s statuary program for whole-
bank resolutions and assets sales. Losing bids are disclosed but bidder names and bid amounts 
are delinked.
13
 
[Insert Figure 1 About Here] 
                                                          
12
 This requirement of selecting the “least cost” bid above direct deposit payoff cost level is in 
place since 1991. “Before 1991, the FDIC could effect any resolution transaction that was less 
costly than a deposit payoff.” 
13
 Detailed discussion could be found from the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) service 
center website at https://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/biddocs.html 
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3. Literature Review 
3.1 Post-Merger Performance 
3.1.1 Market Performance 
Studies focused on examining the post-merger performance of merger entities usually take two 
approaches, either separately or jointly: stock market performance tests and operating 
performance tests. With various measurement windows, many papers examine the abnormal 
stock return for both the bidder and the acquirer on a merger announcement. Almost 
unanimously, results on stock performance of targets in general show that target’s shareholders 
experience positive abnormal returns on merger announcements (Campa and Hernando, 2006; 
Bendeck and Waller, 2007). However, the findings about the abnormal stock return of 
bidders/acquirers are less consistent. The majority report insignificant or negative abnormal 
returns for bidders and insignificant abnormal stock returns for the combined entities. Some 
other studies, however, suggest positive returns for acquirers, especially studies focusing on U.S. 
failed bank mergers (James and Wier, 1987; Loveland, 2012). Many studies also suggest that 
method of payment does matter and mergers with cash as the only method of payment do 
generate a more favorable response (Megginson, Morgan, and Nail, 2004). 
With regards to sources of abnormal returns experienced by acquirer banks, there are mainly two 
dominating arguments: the synergy hypothesis and the wealth transfer (or over-subsidization) 
hypothesis. The synergy hypothesis argues that merger allows combined entities to benefit from 
aspects like cost reductions (Houston et al., 2001), increased market power (Hao, et al., 2012), 
and diversification opportunities through inter-state branching (Cochran et al., 1995), etc. On the 
other hand, papers with wealth transfer hypothesis argue that abnormal returns experienced by 
acquirer banks in failed bank mergers are mainly attributed to the estimated forecast of wealth 
expropriation from the FDIC to the acquirer bank. Cochran et al. (1995) failed to find support for 
the existence of scale or scope economics. James and Wier (1987) argued that the private auction 
with sealed bidding limits competition. Loveland (2012) and Christoffersen et al. (2012) 
suggested that price of failed banks are driven significantly lower during the period of industry 
distress as the FDIC has more pressure to liquidate assets of failed targets at fire-sale prices, 
allowing acquirer banks to benefit. It is difficult, however, to conclude that these two hypotheses 
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are mutually exclusive and either of these two is dominating the other, as it is quite possible that 
acquirer banks could benefit from both opportunities at the same time. 
While widely used, market performance approach has several limitations. First, the value of 
equity investments is affected by forward-looking factors and therefore it may not reveal the 
actual changes in the operations of the business. Second, market measurement makes it hard to 
identify the sources of gains if there is any. Third, it is not possible to study private companies 
using stock market performance, as no market information is available. Fourth, there is the 
possibility of investor overreaction and other market inefficiencies that could invalidate or bias 
the conclusion to some degree. To address the above issues, a strand of studies have applied 
accounting-based measurements, as either a complementary or a substitution to stock market 
return measurement, to capture the realized economic gains resulted from M&A transactions. 
The results of these studies, however, are again mixed. 
3.1.2 Operating Performance 
Healy et al. (1992) first adopted pre-tax operating cash flow as a proxy for operating 
performance in studying non-financial firms. Their results suggested that post-merger operating 
performance of merged firms is significantly improved and is consistent with reactions in the 
equity market. Switzer (1996) revisited the questions and found consistent results with a larger 
sample. Ghosh and Jain (2000) found evidence that financial leverage of combined firms 
increase significantly following merger activities, and equity markets respond positively. Results 
also suggested that increase in financial leverage mainly comes from increased debt capacity and 
only part of the increment is from unused pre-merger debt capacity. Megginson et al. (2004) 
suggested that changes in post-merger operating performance are positively related to changes in 
corporate focus. Carline et al. (2009) found that operating performance improvement is in a bell-
shape relationship with board size and the presence of outside block-holders contribute positively 
with monitoring effects suggested by previous literature (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
Apart from above studies, there is another stream of studies arguing a potential bias in Healy et 
al. (1992) methodology. These studies claimed that, with proper adjustments, improvement in 
post-merger operating performance found in earlier studies would no longer be at the same level, 
if not being removed completely. For example, Ghosh (2001) suggested that using industry 
10 
 
median as a benchmark loses its credibility, if merger companies are systematically 
outperforming the median level or if acquirers experienced superior performance right before the 
transaction, and using market value of assets as a deflator might introduce bias. Following 
Barber and Lyon (1996) and Loughran and Ritter (1997), Ghosh compared merged firms only 
with a peer group matched on pre-merger performance and size and scaled measurements by 
total sales instead. Significant improvements in operating performance documented in Healy et 
al. (1992) were found to be eliminated. Ghosh’s adjustments are widely adopted by many 
subsequent studies (Fee and Thomas, 2004; Powell and Stark, 2005). Powell and Stark (2005), 
while still documented evidence of improvements in post-merger operating performance, 
suggested that results are sensitive to methodology, operating performance proxy, benchmark, 
and deflator choices, and Barber and Lyon (1996) argued that the better choice of an operating 
performance proxy should indeed depend on research questions. 
Aside from general M&A studies, mergers with banks involved are often separately studied due 
to differences in regulation and operation. Many studies focusing on bank mergers found 
evidence of improved operating performance for combined entities with various adjustments 
applied to reflect differences between regular firms and banks (Cornett and Tehranian, 1992; 
Campa and Hernando, 2006; Knapp et al., 2006; DeLong and DeYoung, 2007). Specifically, 
Cornett and Tehranian (1992) included marketable securities in the performance calculation, 
both Campa and Hernando (2006) and DeLong and DeYoung (2007) adopted multiple bank-
specific measurements as performance proxies, and Knapp et al. (2006) took mean reversion into 
consideration when forming proxies. 
Examining the source of gains for bank M&As, Houston et al. (2001) found that merged banks 
benefit significantly more from cost reduction, from things like eliminating overlapping 
operations, than revenue enhancement. Al-Sharkas et al. (2008) suggested that merger banks 
enjoying improved productivity growth resulted from a higher technological efficiency. DeLong 
(2003), while finding evidence showing that the stock market tends to favor focus-driven 
mergers over diversification-driven mergers, suggested that long-term performance of merged 
banks is only advanced in earning-stream focus deals. 
11 
 
3.2 The FDIC-assisted Failed Bank Mergers 
Within bank mergers, we further identify a unique sub-sample composed of government-assisted 
mergers. The focus of this study is on this sample. It is unique because not only is there a 
government agent called the FDIC involved, but targets in these M&As are officially failed 
banks as determined by federal or state banking regulatory agencies. A wide group of studies has 
been devoted to this area. 
3.2.1 Failed Bank Auctions 
James and Wier (1987) examined the possibility of wealth transfer in failed bank mergers. They 
argued that winning bidders in the FDIC-assisted mergers experience positively significant 
abnormal returns that are greater than abnormal returns experienced by acquirers in non-assisted 
mergers. However, the abnormal return decreases as the number of bidding participants 
increases, which are consistent with many other studies (Bertin et al., 1989; Loveland, 2012). 
They claimed that this is an evidence of wealth transfer, but did mention that total benefits to the 
FDIC might be underestimated. For example, with qualification screening and private invitation, 
the FDIC may actually lower the chance of future failure of acquirers, and quicker resolution of 
transaction could prevent potential public losses. Abnormal returns to bidders might just be the 
price that the FDIC pays temporarily to prevent further costs. 
Bertin et al. (1989) found evidence of underbidding and confirmed a negative relationship 
between abnormally positive returns experienced by failed bank acquirers and bidding 
competition. Authors attributed positive market reactions to industry level factors like reduced 
overall purchase power from survivor banks, increased supply of failed banks as well as removal 
of restrictions on interstate and intrastate branching. Other papers supporting the underbidding 
hypothesis include Cochran et al. (1995), Loveland (2012), and Cowan and Salotti (2013). 
Specifically, Loveland (2012) claimed that positively abnormal return experienced by acquirers 
is higher in the recent crisis as compared to the crisis during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Zhang (1997) studied bidder gains in the FDIC-assisted mergers and concluded that bidder firms 
learn through experiences. In particular, first time bidders did not seem to benefit from acquiring 
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a failed bank from the FDIC. However as banks continue to participate in future auctions, their 
chance of improved abnormal returns were enhanced.  
While most previous studies report positive abnormal returns following bank merger 
announcements, there are studies that report the opposite finding, which is consistent with the 
general Winner’s Curse hypothesis. For example, Pettway and Trifts (1985) and Giliberto and 
Varaiya (1989) reported that bidders in the FDIC-assisted auctions tend to overbid. 
3.2.2 Cost of Resolving Failed Banks to the FDIC 
Using the difference between the book value of assets and the realized value of assets as loss 
proxy, James (1991) studied losses associated with bank failures and concluded that financial 
firms experience more severe losses, equaling to about 10% of their assets, when going bankrupt, 
which is more significant than that of non-financial firms. Also his results suggested that the 
FDIC, if possible, should favor whole bank transactions and not retain any assets from failed 
banks as losses are much less if assets are assumed by the acquiring banks. 
Bennett and Unal (2011) contrasted the liquidation option to the private-sector reorganization 
option that is available for the FDIC. The results suggested that the FDIC Improvement Act 
(1991) advanced cost-saving benefits that private-sector reorganization provides. In addition, 
they found that the FDIC involvement leads to lower cost of resolving failed banks. In addition 
to the resolving mechanism, Granja (2013) argued that information asymmetry affects overall 
cost of resolving a failed bank. In particular, this paper argued that uninformed bidders are less 
likely to participate in the FDIC failed bank auctions, unless they are geographically closer. 
Therefore, the author believed that further disclosure requirement could help to attract potential 
buyers and aim to lower the total cost of resolution. 
Christoffersen et al. (2012) studied the FDIC’s ability in solving failed banks and concluded that 
it is easier for acquirers to expropriate wealth from the FDIC during the financial crisis period. 
They attributed it to the fact that during an industry level crisis, the FDIC itself was financially 
distressed and therefore more than willing to sell a failed bank at a fire sale price. These fire 
sales allowed acquirers to enjoy wealth transfer from the FDIC, which is found to be long-term 
and even more significant if the acquirer is a public company. 
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3.2.3 Miscellaneous 
Although US financial sector experienced major deregulation regarding interstate and intrastate 
branching since 1990s, many papers still report evidence of a higher chance of bank failure in 
certain areas. Using data from the most recent crisis, Aubuchon and Wheelock (2010) studied 
bank failures and its geographic distribution. They concluded that certain states and regions 
produced more failed bank cases than others, which is partially consistent with Bhuyan et al. 
(2010). Wheelock (2011a), however, found that although overall market concentration in U.S. 
financial sector has been increased substantially, local markets did not produce obvious sign for 
increased concentration, neither does the number of leading banks. This result is also found to be 
the case in Adams (2012). Wheelock (2011b) reinforced his findings saying that the recent 
financial crisis and dramatic increase in failed bank mergers had only little impact on the 
concentration level of U.S. banking industry, even after including large cases like the acquisition 
of Washington Mutual Bank by JPMorgan Chase. 
Starting from December 2007, the FASB requires banks to report a Bargain Purchase Gain 
(BPG) in current earnings report at the completion of M&As. Dunn et al. (2011) examined the 
utilization of such an accounting method by bank managers and found evidence that bank 
managers tend to report BPG to avoid reporting lowered earnings or even losses, which is the 
initial intention of FASB. 
Studying the relation between economic activity and bank liquidity, Acharya et al. (2011) found 
evidence of counter cyclical pattern. Specifically, banks preserve lower level of liquidity during 
economic boom and high level of liquidity during financial crisis. The argument is that banks 
maintain liquidity to benefit from fire-priced assets of failed or distressed banks during financial 
crisis, but such incentive is lower during healthy economic conditions. 
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4. Hypothesis Development 
As discussed earlier, we would like to analyze our merger sample from operating and market 
perspectives respectively. We believe that operating performance changes of acquirers resulting 
from a merger transaction is a topic of interest in general. First, there could be many reasons 
behind merger transactions like economic synergies, managerial incentives for personal interests, 
or simply empire building (Too-Big-Too-Fail). Second, a merger is the most important way of 
spending capital from a business point of view, so that to its shareholders, return on capital 
invested is the primary indication of success. Our main sample includes the FDIC-assisted failed 
bank mergers. For such a sample, this investigation becomes even more interesting. In addition, 
the FDIC is often questioned for the private handling of its organized resolution of failed 
financial institutions. Evidences should be provided to show if these private arrangements make 
economic sense.  
Buying a failed peer is a high risky proposition especially during financial turmoil. Acquirer 
banks then should have pricing power over the FDIC (provides incentives) in negotiating deals, 
which could lead to wealth expropriation. Meanwhile, such negotiation power is likely to allow 
acquirers to get higher discounts on assets being acquired. Post-merger accounting ratios of 
acquiring banks then will be inflated when using book value of assets as the deflator. 
Additionally, the FDIC should have privileged information regarding the financial strength of 
insured banks, information that is not known to the public. This advantage, along with its 
experience in resolving many failed banks over the past decades, should allow the FDIC to select 
ideal buyers that would generate real merger synergies. All the above reasons lead to our first 
hypothesis stated as follow: 
Hypothesis 1a: Acquirers from regulatory mergers outperform their non-merger peers from an 
operating perspective  
We also compare post-merger operating performance between acquirers from regulatory mergers 
and non-regulatory mergers. This is interesting because according to previous literature, overall 
purchase power of survivors would be impaired during a financial crisis and if this is the case, 
survivor banks in general would more likely have limited resources which would allow them to 
initiate few M&As if any. Thus making a choice between two merger approaches, assuming 
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underlying banks are invited to the FDIC’s closed auction, would be a very critical decision for 
bank managers to make and knowing the differences in possible outcomes in general as a 
guideline would help to improve the decision making of managements and ultimately improve 
the capital utilization of these banks. 
The reasons such differences between the two might exist are as follows: first of all, the 
resolution of failed banks by the FDIC has a fairly short time-window (a detailed discussion of 
the Timeline of the FDIC Resolution Process could be found in Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, 1998), this means interested candidates only have limited time to perform basic due 
diligence. Even if time permits, a thorough due diligence of a large failed bank could also be 
quite expensive if a potential acquirer is not guaranteed to win. Second, as discussed by 
Loveland (2012), the information asymmetry hypothesis suggests that during distressed 
economic downturns the actual bankruptcy of targets imposes many uncertainties and challenges 
on assets valuations. Third, unlike regular mergers, acquirers in regulatory mergers negotiate 
with the FDIC directly instead of target’s management and are provided with identical 
information, allowing no bidder to have any advantages. Fourth, because cash is the only 
accepted method of payment for all the FDIC assisted mergers, regulatory merger acquirers are 
dealing with more risks than acquirers in non-regulatory mergers who can bring shareholders 
from target banks on board to share risks through stock payments. Finally, the typical agreement 
between the FDIC and the selected acquirers usually has a contingent claim similar to a futures 
contract that caps the acquirers’ downside losses as well as their upside gains. All these risks 
faced by potential acquirers make them more likely to underbid during a failed bank auction 
allowing them to benefit from wealth transfer, and this leads to our second hypothesis stated 
below: 
Hypothesis 1b: Acquirers from regulatory mergers outperform their peers from non-regulatory 
mergers from an operating perspective  
Building on Hypothesis 1a but from a market perspective, we believe that investors will expect 
such advancements in the post-merger operating performance of acquirers. In other words, we 
believe that the market is efficient and it will account for positive outcomes from regulatory 
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mergers. At the same time, general studies also show that cash acquisitions tend to result in 
better market reactions (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Therefore, we propose that: 
Hypothesis 2: Acquirers from regulatory mergers would experience positive cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) around the merger announcement date  
The failed bank auction of FDIC is a closed event as only qualified candidates selected by the 
FDIC can participate. One of the rules that the FDIC follows in selecting acquirer candidates is 
to lower the chance of future failure of merged entities. In other words, banks being selected by 
the FDIC should be healthier than majority of their peers in general, holding everything else 
equal. This information could be a very important signal for public investors. In fact, the FDIC 
started to release bid summary information regarding unsuccessful bidders and unsuccessful bids 
in early 2010 because of a high level of public interest.
14
 We believe that general public, 
especially investors, are interested in this information because it could be treated as a signal, just 
like a dividend or stock repurchase announcement, to reduce information asymmetry. 
During financial crisis, the capital market would be in such chaos that it would challenge 
investors to identify real investment opportunities. If investors know that there is a group of 
banks being “certified”, by a regulator as healthier, they could simply narrow down their 
screening pool, or at least pay more attention to this group of banks as safer investments which is 
critical during crisis time. This should be the case regarding not only actual auction winners, but 
also those who participated but did not win. Thus, investors would generally respond favorably 
when the names of these banks are revealed.
15
 Meanwhile, we also believe that the market 
should only reward these banks once. The “Certification” information carried by the signal is 
only valuable for first time bidders. Second or multiple time bidders are not likely to experience 
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 See the summary of the FDIC’s bid disclosure policy at 
https://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/biddocs.html 
15
 Release of bid summaries is lagging the release of merger details regarding the final winners 
and agreements between the FDIC and acquirers (Refer to section 2 for more details). In other 
words, date of releasing bid summaries (except the information regarding the cover bidder and 
its bid) is usually days or even weeks behind the actual closing date of a merger. Bid summaries 
are drafted, reviewed, and posted as soon as the FDIC’s workload allows, but without a strict 
time frame. 
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a “certification” effect because they already received this benefit from participating in an earlier 
action. Formalizing the above arguments, we propose the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a: Acquirers from regulatory mergers who are first time failed bank auction 
participants would experience higher positive CARs around the merger 
announcement date as compared to acquirers who have participated in the failed 
bank auction before 
Hypothesis 3b: Unsuccessful bidders from regulatory mergers who are first time failed bank 
auction participants would experience positive CARs around the bid summary 
release date while unsuccessful bidders who have participated in the failed bank 
auction before would experience no significant CARs  
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5. Data 
Data for this study consists of two parts. The first part contains all information required for 
operating performance tests. The M&As information during 2004 to 2013, including merge date 
and type, and names, IDs, locations and parents of targets and acquirers, is obtained from the 
Mergers and Acquisitions database of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. All audited 
accounting information that are reported by insured U.S. commercial banks/depository 
institutions (mainly national banks, state member banks and insured non-member banks) to the 
FDIC on a quarterly frequency (Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income or simply Call 
Report hereafter) is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago as well as the Public 
Data Distribution site (PDD) of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) 
Central Data Repository. The common identification used to merge these two datasets is the 
RSSD ID (named as SURV_ID/NON_ID in merger dataset and RSSD9001 in call reports). 
Because Call Report data is on a quarterly frequency while our performance measures are using 
yearly frequency, the following treatments are taken to convert call report data before merging 
two datasets and forming variables. Regarding balance sheet items, the last quarter data of each 
calendar year is taken. If fourth quarter data is missing, we use Quarter 3 data instead. If Quarter 
3 data is also missing, we drop that company-year observation. Regarding income statement 
items, the average is calculated first using four quarters’ data with missing value(s) automatically 
excluded and then annual measures are calculated by multiplying each average by four. This 
approach should take care of any missing data points. 
In addition, when dealing with Call Report data, there are two things worth noting. First, not all 
banks are filing the same report form. Domestic banks will report under form FFIEC 031 if they 
have foreign offices and under form FFIEC 041 if they do not, and general summary statistics of 
these two groups are presented in Table 1. Differences are presented in balance sheet item codes 
mainly. For example, cash and equivalence is item RCFD0010 in form FFIEC 031 but item 
RCON0010 in form FFIEC 041.The second issue is that these two forms are also evolving as 
regulations change. For example, before 2007, income from investment banking, advisory, 
brokerage, and underwriting fees and commissions is under one item named RIADB490 in both 
forms. However, since 2007, it is separated into three different items, RIADC886, RIADC888 
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and RIADC887. Full lists of all items involved in this study with detailed explanations are shown 
in Tables 2a, 2b and 2c. 
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
[Insert Table 2a About Here] 
[Insert Table 2b About Here] 
[Insert Table 2c About Here] 
Bank merger data obtained from the Chicago Fed contains a total of 3416 records (transactions 
with multiple acquirers are stored as separate records) during 2005 to 2013. The entire sample is 
kept for filtering purposes but only 2007 to 2011 transactions are studied closely. After deleting 
split cases with Merger Code equals to five (6 cases), and asset sales with Merger Code equals to 
seven (30 cases), we are left with 3380 records.
 16
 We further limit our sample by removing all 
transactions that took place between 2008 to 2011 which the acquirer had at least one other 
M&A transaction during its [-2Y, +2Y]
17
 window, so that pre- and post-merger performance of 
banks will not be affected by any other M&A deals other than the one that we are studying. After 
the above filtering steps, we then remove all the remaining transactions that happened before 
2008 or after 2011. In the end, we are left with a total of 470 M&As for the period of 2008-2011, 
among which 376 cases are non-regulatory M&As (Merger Codes 1 or 9) and 94 regulatory 
M&As (Merger Code 50).
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 For Split cases with Merger Code 5, “non-survivor transfers between 40 and 94 percent of its 
assets to one or more newly formed survivors. Non-survivor and survivor continue to exist. Non-
survivor has not failed; government assistance is not involved”. For Sale of Assets cases with 
Merger Code 7, “non-survivor transfers between 40 and 94 percent of its assets to one or more 
existing survivors. Non-survivor and survivor continue to exist. Non-survivor has not failed; 
government assistance is not involved”. More information could be found in the information file 
provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago along with the data file. 
17
 This stands for period from 2 years before the merger transaction to 2 years after the merger 
transaction 
18
 For Merger Code 1 (Charter Discontinued cases), “non-survivor transfers its assets to one or 
more survivors. Non-survivor ceases to exist as a head office. One charter has been discontinued, 
or will be discontinued in the near future. Non-survivor has not failed; government assistance is 
not involved”. For Merger Code 9 (Charter Retained cases), “non-survivor transfers 95 percent 
or more of its assets to one or more survivors. The charter that had been associated with non-
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The second part of our data contains all information required for event studies. Along with 
merger data discussed above (which contains information about acquirers of regulatory mergers 
and their parent holding companies), we obtain a list of unsuccessful bidders
19
 manually from the 
FDIC website.
20
 Their RSSD ID and parent holding company information are also manually 
collected from the FDIC website
21
 and confirmed with information from Competitive Analysis 
and Structure Source Instrument for Depository Institutions (CASSIDI) from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis
22
. The PERMCO-RSSD links are retrieved from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York (2014)
23
, and the PERMCO-PERMNO links and all stock data (daily 
frequency) are retrieved from CRSP through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Because 
the release date of bid summaries are lagging the actual merger announcement/closing date for 
regulatory mergers, we obtain a list of actual bid summary release dates for each failed bank case 
from the FDIC through a special FDIC FOIA request. The final sample is consolidated at the top 
holding company level. The merger sample contains only records with publicly traded acquirers 
but the targets can be publicly traded or privately held. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
survivor continues to exist and a new ID_RSSD is assigned to it. Non-survivor has not failed; 
government assistance is not involved”. For Merger Code 50 (Failure: Government Assistance 
Provided cases), “non-survivor fails and ceases to exist. Disposition was arranged by the FDIC, 
RTC, NCUA, or other regulatory agency. Assets may be distributed to other entities as well as 
the regulatory agency”. More information could be found in the information file provided by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago along with the data file. 
19
 Because the release of the cover bid (the second highest bid) and its bidder has a one-year 
moratorium, cover bidders are excluded from unsuccessful bidder sample. 
20
 See https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html 
21
 See https://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp 
22
 See http://cassidi.stlouisfed.org/institutions. This database contains information about all 
historical activities for each individual bank and their parent holding companies and is used to 
retrieve parent holding company information for each individual bank back to a historical date in 
case of ownership changes which is not disclosed in the FDIC database (the FDIC database only 
shows up-to-date information regarding parent holding companies). 
23
 See http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html 
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6. Methodology 
6.1 Propensity Score Matching 
To discover merger effects from operating perspective, we measure post-merger performance of 
banks for two years following the transaction, Years +1 and +2 respectively (Year 0 is the year 
during which the merger transaction took place), and compare them with pre-merger level to 
reveal any significant differences. Regarding the pre-merger performance, banks’ performance in 
Year -1 is used in the main test, and as a robustness check, average of banks’ performances in 
Years -1 and -2 is used. Since two banks involved in a merger transaction report individual 
financial conditions before Year 0 but joint results after Year 0, we follow the literature (Cornett 
and Tehranian, 1992; DeLong and DeYoung, 2007) to form joint characteristics for the pre-
merger period with weighted average calculation, based on both acquirer’s and target’s total 
asset size. The main reason behind such treatment is that the targets are most likely to be in 
serious financial distress right before the merger, the targets in regulatory mergers are officially 
on the verge of bankruptcy or already bankrupted. Thus, the weak financial situations of the 
targets before the mergers will almost certainly bring down the absolute performance level for 
the combined entities, at least in the short to median term. Our proposed adjustment regarding 
the pre-merger benchmark will consider this factor and form pair-to-pair comparison. Thus, it 
should more accurately capture changes coming from the merger synergy instead of simply 
correcting the bad performance of the targets. 
In this study, we adopt the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method to conduct performance 
change comparison between different parties. Propensity Score Matching was first introduced by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and is used in evaluating merger effects in many bank merger 
studies (Egger and Hahn, 2010; Behr and Heid, 2011). It allows us to compare a company with 
only comparable counterparties on an individual basis and such comparison made it possible to 
study just the treatment effect without worrying about group statistics being skewed by extreme 
samples or any other uncontrolled factors. The “treatment” refers to the merger activity and 
therefore treatment effect is the merger effect that acquirer banks would experience. In this 
study, we implement the Stata program developed by Becker and Ichino (2002) to perform the 
actual test and details will be discussed later. 
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The first step of PSM is to assign banks into two groups – the treated (merger) group (Merger 
Dummy=1) and the control group (Merger Dummy=0) – and then use a propensity score model 
to estimate the likelihood of a random bank being involved in a merger activity.
24
 A PSM model 
is a logit/probit model with the merger dummy as the dependent variable and a set of 𝑋s as 
independent variables, described as follows: 
𝑝(𝑋s) = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 = 1|𝑋s) = 𝐸(𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟|𝑋s)                                                                (6.1) 
Where 𝑋𝑠 include seven different performance proxies as suggested by Behr and Heid (2011): 
 Size: measured by logarithm of total current book value of assets; 
 ROA: return on lagged assets measured as net income over lagged total book value of 
assets; 
 Cost-income Ratio (CI): measured by sum of current interest and non-interest expenses 
over sum of current interest and noninterest incomes; 
 Interest Margin (IM): measured by the difference between interest rate on interest 
bearing assets and interest rate on interest bearing liabilities; 
 Equity Ratio (EQR): measured by total current book value of equity over lagged total 
book value of assets; 
 Non-performing Loans (NPL): measured by total current non-performing loans (loans 
past due 90 days or more but still accruing plus nonaccrual loans) scaled by lagged total 
book value of assets; 
 Liquidity Ratio (LQR): measured by total liquid assets (cash and cash equivalence, plus 
fed funds sold, plus securities available for sale plus securities held to maturity) scaled by 
lagged total book value of assets. 
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Treated group includes all banks remaining in the filtered merger sample. Control group 
includes only those that are not involved, either as an acquirer or as a target, in neither regulatory 
merger nor non-regulatory merger. 
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The propensity score is essentially the conditional probability of a bank getting involved in 
merger activity given pre-merger performances 𝑋s. Another way of understanding the propensity 
score here is that two banks with similar propensity scores are considered similar across all X 
dimensions right before the merger activity. With each bank assigned a propensity score, we then 
find matching bank(s) from the control group for every bank in the merger group. The idea of 
PSM is to compare performance of a merger (acquiring) bank with performance of that same 
bank if it does not have a merger transaction. With close propensity scores, we can 
hypothetically treat matching bank(s) as the twin bank for its merger bank and its performance 
would be treated as the approximation of the performance of that merger bank without a merger 
transaction. Performance change of individual banks is calculated by subtracting pre-merger 
performance from its own post-merger level for all banks involved, and then a difference-in-
difference measure (the merger effects) between each merger and matching bank pair is formed 
by subtracting the performance change of the matching bank from the performance change of its 
associated merger bank. The mathematical interpretation is as follow
25
: 
𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 𝐸(𝑃1𝑎 − 𝑃1𝑏|𝑋s, 𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑃0𝑎 − 𝑃0𝑏|𝑋s, 𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 = 1)           (6.2) 
Where: 
 P stands for an operating performance measure, either ROA or CI; 
 Subscript 𝑎 and 𝑏 stand for post- and pre-merger period respectively; 
 1 and 0 stand for whether or not a bank has a merger transaction, or simply merger and 
matching banks respectively in this case. 
After carefully investigating the discussion made by Becker and Ichino (2002) regarding 
propensity score matching and their Stata program, we apply the following methodologies. In 
order to avoid year effects on banks’ performances and rather than include year dummies in our 
propensity score estimation model, matching banks are only selected from the same year in 
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 This model expression is modified based on Propensity Score Matching introduction 
developed by Econometrics Academy available at 
https://sites.google.com/site/econometricsacademy/econometrics-models/propensity-score-
matching 
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which the merger bank had its transaction. The matching method applied here is a hybrid that 
combines the one-on-one nearest neighbor and radius matching methods. The nearest neighbor 
matching method matches each merger bank with a single control bank that has the closest 
propensity score. In contrast, the radius matching method matches each merger bank with a set 
of control banks (equally weighted) whose propensity scores are within a pre-defined range 
(radius) of the propensity score of the merger bank. While the basic nearest neighbor matching 
strategy is very commonly used in the literature due to its simplicity (Egger and Hahn, 2010; 
Lemmon and Roberts, 2010; Petrova and Shafer, 2010), we employ the idea of radius matching 
to adjust our nearest neighbor matching to improve the quality of the matches. Specifically, it is 
likely that a matching bank obtained from the basic nearest neighboring match would be a poor 
approximation for the merger bank because of a closest yet very different propensity score. We 
impose a radius restriction (radius=0.0001) so that the matching bank has a propensity score that 
is not only closest to but also within ±0.0001 of the propensity score of its associated merger 
bank. We allow replacement so that a control bank could be the matching bank for multiple 
merger banks, and employ common support option so that matching process would only be 
performed within the common range of propensity scores of merger and control banks. We 
perform the comparison on two performance indicators similar to Behr and Heid (2011): ROA as 
a profitability proxy and Cost-Income Ratio as a cost efficiency proxy (both are included as 
control characteristics 𝑋s in the propensity score estimation model).  
Regarding our sub-test for Hypothesis 1b, the treatment group is banks with regulatory mergers, 
the control group should be banks with non-regulatory mergers and the treatment effect should 
be the difference in performance changes between the two merger types. However due to the fact 
that sample sizes of non-regulatory merger group for each year of 2008 to 2011 are not 
significantly larger than that of regulatory merger group for that same year, we cannot ensure the 
quality of matches as even the closest match selected from non-regulatory merger group might 
still be too different from its counterparty from regulatory merger group and thus treatment 
effects revealed, if any, would become meaningless. 
To address this issue, we separate our entire sample into three groups: acquirer banks from 
regulatory mergers, acquirer banks from non-regulatory mergers, and all remaining banks, which 
were not involved in any type of merger transactions, neither as an acquirer nor as a target. All 
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three groups are filtered for the [-2Y,+2Y] window so that both acquirer groups consist of banks 
with only one merger that takes place in Year 0 and the control group consists of all banks with 
no merger transactions, neither as an acquirer or as a target, during the entire period. The former 
two groups are treated groups that will be used in two separate PSM tests respectively and the 
last group is the common control group, which is used in both PSM tests. Even though acquirers 
from both regulatory and non-regulatory mergers are only compared to their close matches 
instead of with each other directly, we believe it is still a fair comparison given the assumption 
that those close matches are proxies to the acquirer banks themselves without merger transaction. 
In other words, this is still a difference-in-difference comparison between two groups. 
6.2 Regression 
In addition to Propensity Score Matching, we also employ the basic multi-linear regression 
methodology to further analyze post-merger operating performance of involving banks and 
specifically the effect of underpricing on performance of those acquirer banks. Regression 
analyses are performed over two steps. In step 1, we employ equation (6.3) shown below to 
verify whether or not earlier results from PSM tests hold in a traditional approach. The sample 
here would include acquirer banks from regulatory and/or non-regulatory mergers and their 
matching banks obtained from earlier PSM tests. 
∆𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 =
𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔_𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔_𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 +
 ∑ 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟_𝑋𝑠
8
𝑖=3 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀                              (6.3) 
Where: 
 ∆𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 stands for ROA or CI change of a bank between Year -1 and Year +1 
(or +2); 
 𝑅𝑒𝑔_𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 is a dummy variable that takes 1 if a bank is a regulatory merger acquirer 
and 0 otherwise; 
 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔_𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 is a dummy variable that takes 1 if a bank is a non-regulatory merger 
acquirer and 0 otherwise; 
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 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟_𝑋𝑠 are 6 dimensions (Size, IM, EQR, NPL, LQR and either ROA or CI 
depending on the dependent variable used) of a bank in Year -1; 
 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 are a set of year dummies. 
In step 2, we employ equation (6.4) over the sample consisting all regulatory merger acquirer 
banks and their matching banks. We combine each acquirer bank observation with the 
observation of its matching bank to form measurements of differences and our dependent 
variable becomes a difference-in-difference measurement, the same as the merger effect from 
earlier PSM tests. We include two new variables named 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 to 
estimate the degree of underpricing. Details of the equation and variables involved are discussed 
as follow: 
 
𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 =
𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟_𝑋𝑠_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓
8
𝑖=3 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀                      (6.4) 
Where: 
 𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 stands for the difference in ROA or CI change from Year -1 to Year +1 
(or +2) between an acquirer bank and its matching bank; 
 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 is the difference between sale price of Equity and last reported book 
value of Equity of the target that underlying acquirer bank purchased scaled by last 
reported book value of Assets of the target; 
 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is the average between number of bidders and number of bids in a failed 
bank auction; 
 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟_𝑋𝑠_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 are differences between an acquirer bank and its matching bank in 
6 dimensions (Size, IM, EQR, NPL, LQR and either ROA or CI depending on the 
dependent variable used) in Year -1; 
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 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 are a set of year dummies. 
6.3 Event Study 
In order to test Hypotheses 2, 3a and 3b, we adopt the standard event study to estimate abnormal 
stock returns based on Brown and Warner (1985). We take the merger announcement (closing) 
date as Day 0 for a regulatory merger and the bid summary release date as Day 0 for an 
unsuccessful bidder. For each bank in our study sample, we estimate a standard OLS market 
model, shown below, using data for trading Days -270 to -21 inclusive, so that we have 
approximately included one year of market data.
26
 We leave 20 trading days between the 
estimation window of the market model and Day 0 to avoid any abnormal market movements 
due to potential information leakage. We perform our market reaction test over five event 
windows: [-10,-3], [-2,-1], [0,+1], [0,+2], and [+3,+10]. 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                         (6.5) 
We filter our sample to make sure that no merger bank in the sample will have a second merger 
(or no unsuccessful bidder will have any merger activity), either regulatory or non-regulatory, for 
the entire period from Trading Day -270 to Trading Day +10. However, we do allow an acquirer 
to have successive mergers as long as these following mergers are closed within half a year (125 
trading days) of the first merger in the series. We still restrict these successive mergers to be at 
least 10 trading days apart so that the event window is clean. For these successive merger cases 
included, their estimation window takes the announcement date of the first case in the series as 
Day 0 (in other words, they are sharing the same estimated market model), and their event 
window takes the actual announcement date of their own as Day 0. Similar treatment is done for 
the unsuccessful bidder group as well. 
In terms of actual calculation, we use the CRSP value-weighted return (including distributions) 
as our market index proxy to estimate market models for each bank in our sample. Once beta and 
alpha are estimated, we then use this market model to predict abnormal returns for each day over 
a specific event window (equation 6.6). For each event window, we sum all daily abnormal 
                                                          
26
 We allow a minimum of 200 trading days as the estimation window for banks without enough 
public stock data available 
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returns for each bank to form the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) (equation 6.7) and then 
we perform the statistical test with robust standard errors and bootstrapping. 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
̂ = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖?̂? + 𝛽𝑖𝑡
̂ ∗ 𝑅𝑀𝑡)                                                                                                  (6.6) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
̂𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
                                                                                                        (6.7) 
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7. Results 
7.1 Propensity Score Matching 
We conduct summary statistics for banks included in the study regarding each variable used in 
PSM tests. Table 3a, 3b, and 3c present the results for regulatory merger group, non-regulatory 
merger group and unsuccessful bidder group from failed bank auctions respectively.  
[Insert Table 3a About Here] 
[Insert Table 3b About Here] 
[Insert Table 3c About Here] 
Several observations can be made from these tables. First, before having a merger, acquirers 
from both regulatory and non-regulatory merger groups were exhibiting similar characteristics 
(shown in Panel A and B in Table 3a and 3b respectively) with the exception that acquirers from 
non-regulatory merger group are almost 3 times larger than those from the regulatory merger 
group. However, a significantly larger size for acquirers from the non-regulatory merger group is 
likely to be skewed by mega banks within the sample (see median statistics). This is exactly why 
we prefer using Propensity Score Matching to traditional group-based comparison methods. 
Second, even though acquirers from the regulatory merger group are smaller than their 
counterparties, targets from the regulatory merger group are relatively bigger. Third, targets from 
the regulatory merger group are characterized by significantly lower profitability, lower cost 
efficiency, under capitalization, higher non-performing assets and lower liquidity.  
Before Propensity Score Matching test, we perform a traditional Equality Test with filtering 
window [-2Y,+2Y] as a start. We compare average performance of control and merger groups 
and see whether or not they are statistically equal to each other at group level. Like what we do 
in PSM, we take Year -1 performance as well as the average of Year -1 and -2 performances as 
the pre-merger benchmarks. Results are shown in Table 4. Clearly, acquirers from regulatory 
mergers experienced significant improvements in both ROA and CI in both Year +1 and +2, and 
this is consistent when we change the pre-merger benchmark shown in Panel B. However, 
acquirers from non-regulatory mergers only experienced some degrees of improvement in cost 
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efficiency in random years, and results become insignificant when we change the pre-merger 
benchmark. 
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
However, the Equality Test has its potential problem. Some papers suggest that using industry 
overall statistics as a benchmark loses its credibility if merger companies are systematically 
outperforming the mean/median level (Ghosh, 2001). Therefore, with above results documented, 
we then perform PSM tests with the hybrid matching strategy for the same filtering window and 
results for the combined sample are presented in Table 5. We perform two separate PSM tests 
(one for regulatory merger group and the other for non-regulatory merger group) for each of two 
performance proxies with performance from Year -1 as the benchmark first shown in Panel A, 
and then repeat the process with average performance from Year -1 and -2 as the benchmark 
shown in Panel B. 
[Insert Table 5 About Here] 
Results between two groups are distinct again. Regulatory merger acquirers seem to experience 
significant improvements in both profitability and cost efficiency and such merger gains last in 
both 1 and 2 years after the merger transaction. Non-regulatory merger acquirers, on the other 
hand, seem to enjoy no benefits from initiating a voluntary merger, at least in the immediate 
terms after a merger transaction. Results are consistent in both Panel A and Panel B. We also 
employ the pairwise test to assess the quality of the matches and results are presented in Table 6. 
The pairwise test results suggest that our merger banks and their matching banks share similar 
pre-merger firm characteristics in general and they should perform similarly if nothing else 
happened. Therefore, any differences detected in the PSM test should not be attributed to the 
difference in their pre-merger characteristics but to the merger event instead. 
 [Insert Table 6 About Here] 
We then group mergers by year to discover post-merger operating performance of acquirers with 
mergers closed in different years. Results are presented in Table 7. From Panel A in Table 7, 
merger effects on profitability for deals done during 2009 and 2010 are found to be significantly 
positive in Year +1 and/or +2. These significant results indicate that acquirers of regulatory 
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mergers done during 2009 and 2010 were experiencing positively abnormal changes in ROA as 
compared to their close peers who did not have any mergers and such benefit from the merger 
was immediately realized after the merger transaction and lasted for at least 2 years. A closer 
look also indicates that acquirers having mergers done in later years appear to enjoy higher 
abnormal profitability improvements than those of earlier mergers, peaking at the year of 2010. 
In particular, abnormal ROA advancements are indifferent from 0 for deals done in 2008, 
increased to 3 percentage points (ppts) for deals done in 2010 and then backed to insignificant 
from 0 for deals done in 2011. The non-regulatory merger group, on the other hand, shows no 
significant merger effects and the signs are not always as expected (we are expecting the positive 
sign for ROA effects and the negative sign for CI effects). 
[Insert Table 7 About Here] 
On the cost side, results are very similar. For the regulatory merger group, acquirers having 
mergers done in 2010 and 2011 seem to enjoy consistent abnormal improvements in cost 
efficiency for all two years following the transaction. Acquirers in non-regulatory merger group, 
however, failed to achieve consistent abnormal improvements in cost-income efficiency, not to 
mention again that signs are not always as expected. For acquirers having regulatory mergers 
done in 2010, cost-income ratio is lowered by additional 32 ppts (35.1 ppts) in Year +1 (Year 
+2) due to the merger transaction. Same metrics for deals done in 2011 are 22 ppts and 25.7 ppts 
in Year +1 and +2 respectively. Again, we find that abnormal cost efficiency advancement is 
higher for mergers done in later years, peaking at the year of 2010. 
The theme discussed above also holds when we apply average performance of Year -1 and -2 as 
the benchmark shown in Panel B of Table 7. Non-regulatory merger acquirers seem to have little 
to no benefit from acquiring a peer bank (except for abnormal cost efficiency improvement for 
deals done in 2011) while regulatory merger acquirers, who have their deals done in 2009, 2010 
or 2011, were experiencing abnormal improvements in profitability, cost efficiency, or both. 
In addition to the hybrid matching strategy, which produces one-on-one match pairs, we also 
repeat the PSM test with basic radius (radius=0.0001) matching approach and results are 
presented in Table 8. With basic radius matching, a merger bank now could have multiple 
matching banks as long as these matching banks have a propensity score within ±0.0001 of the 
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propensity score of the merger bank. General theme again holds with even stronger significance. 
Acquirers from the regulatory merger group who acquired a peer bank in 2009, 2010 or 2011 
were experiencing significant abnormal improvements in both profitability and cost efficiency 
right after their transactions and such gains lasted for at least two years following the merger 
event. Stronger results regarding regulatory merger group, however, suggest that evidence of 
abnormal advancement in profitability is sensitive to the matching strategy applied, which might 
be caused by the small sample size we have. Acquirers from the non-regulatory merger group, on 
the other hand, again failed to show any sign of benefits from buying a peer bank, with the 
exception of abnormal cost efficiency improvements in the second year following a merger event 
that takes place in 2008 or 2011.  
[Insert Table 8 About Here] 
When turning to unsuccessful bidders shown in Table 9, results are inconsistent between 
Equality test and PSM test. According to the theory, these banks are ones who participated in a 
failed bank auction but did not end up acquiring a peer bank. Therefore, they should not have 
any abnormal changes in their operating performances, either profitability or cost efficiency, in 
following years as compared to their peers who did not participate in an auction. The PSM test 
results shown in Panel B are consistent with our predictions while the Equality test results shown 
in Panel A are not. This provides favor to the PSM test over traditional group-based comparisons 
and suggests that the PSM test results might be preferred whenever there is an inconsistency in 
results between Equality and PSM tests. 
[Insert Table 9 About Here] 
In addition, we also re-examine the topic by extending the sample-filtering window. By 
replacing [-2Y, +2Y] window by [-3Y, +3Y] window, we are now limiting our samples so that 
underlying M&As, which happened during 2008 to 2010, are the only M&As transaction that 
associated acquirer has during the entire period of 3 years before the merger to 3 years after the 
merger. We also extend performance comparisons to the third year following the transaction and, 
by doing so; we have to drop Year 2011 in our test. We also change one of the pre-merger 
performance benchmark from an average of 2 years before the transaction to average of 3 years 
before the transaction. We made such adjustments for both Equality Test and Propensity Score 
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Matching test and the results are shown in Table 10 and Table 11. Overall themes remain 
consistent, especially under the PSM test. 
[Insert Table 10 About Here] 
[Insert Table 11 About Here] 
7.2 Regression 
With the sample from Panel A in Table 5, we take a step further and perform traditional 
regression analyses. Results for the regression with all acquirer banks from regulatory and non-
regulatory mergers and their matching banks are shown in Table 12 and results for the regression 
with only regulatory merger acquirer banks and their matching banks are shown in Table 13. 
Consistent with earlier observations from PSM tests, the Reg_Merger dummy is statistically 
significant with correct signs across all tests in both tables while the Nonreg_Merger dummy in 
table 12 is not significant except when using CI change of a bank between Year -1 and +2 as the 
dependent variable. These results suggest that regulatory merger acquirer banks experienced 
additional profitability and cost efficiency improvements after the merger transaction while non-
regulatory merger acquirer banks did not. In addition, results also suggest that smaller banks with 
less cost efficiency, higher interest margin, and higher liquidity in earlier years are in general 
more likely to experience additional profitability advancements in later years while banks with 
higher equity capital and less non-performing loans in earlier years are more likely to experience 
additional cost efficiency improvements in later years. 
[Insert Table 12 About Here] 
[Insert Table 13 About Here] 
According to the literature, potential bidders are more likely to underbid in a FDIC failed bank 
auction, which will generate a wealth transfer from the FDIC to the final winner. In order to test 
the impact of underpricing on post-merger operating performance of a failed bank acquirer, we 
employ equation (6.4) stated in methodology section. We manually collect bid information for 
all regulatory mergers in our sample, namely the assets discount and deposit premium data, from 
the FDIC website. Along with the last reported quarterly data of targets, we form an Equity 
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discount proxy calculated as the difference between sale price and book value of total Equity of a 
target scaled by its total Assets.
27
 We also obtain the number of bidders and number of bids to 
estimate the degree of competition in an auction and we drop 7 cases due to data availability 
issue in this step. A full list of mergers included with Equity discount and competition data is 
provided in Table 14. Results of the regression are shown in Table 15. 
[Insert Table 14 About Here] 
[Insert Table 15 About Here] 
Coefficients of neither Equity_Discount nor Competition variables in Table 15 are statistically 
significant in tests with abnormal performance changes, or the merger effect, as the dependent 
variable. This is inconsistent with the argument that synergies of regulatory mergers mainly 
come from the underpricing practice of failed bank acquirers. We realize, however, that the 
significance of those coefficients might be deteriorated by the fact that although it is our best 
approximation, our Equity_Discount measurement does not take the P&A agreement between 
the FDIC and the acquirer into consideration. Therefore, we might underestimate the degree of 
underpricing and thus underestimate the impacts of underpricing on post-merger operating 
performances of acquirer banks. Turning onto other results, we find that smaller acquirer banks 
with less cost efficiency and less non-performing loans as compared to their close peers before 
their merger transactions are found to experience more abnormal improvements in profitability 
and larger acquirer banks with low profitability as compared to their close peers before their 
merger transactions are found to experience more abnormal improvements in cost efficiency. 
This is consistent with our expectation as smaller banks are more likely to benefit from mergers 
that lead to increase in market share and larger banks are more likely to benefit from mergers 
that help to improve operation and management efficiency. 
                                                          
27
 We scale this measurement by total Assets because in many cases target banks reported 
negative book value of Equity in their last quarter and this makes percentage calculation based 
on total Equity meaningless. Meanwhile, we also think about using market value of Equity 
instead to estimate the equity discount; however only one target bank in this sample was publicly 
traded before being acquired and we are forced to drop the idea.  
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7.3 Event Study Results 
The results of analyzing the abnormal stock return of regulatory merger acquirers are shown in 
Table 16. We find significantly positive abnormal market reactions responding to merger 
announcement for acquirers. Our observation is consistent with many earlier studies on failed 
bank mergers and supports the underbidding and wealth transfer hypotheses. Specifically for the 
2-day window [0,+1] with full sample in Panel A, acquirers on average experienced 3.53% 
abnormal return with 66:28 positive-negative ratio. Before Day 0, however, no significant 
abnormal market movement is detected. This is not surprising given that the entire failed bank 
resolution process was kept confidential by all parties with signed agreements that prohibit 
information leakage to the public or insiders before the FDIC’s official announcement. The 
positive CARs for [0,+1] window could be rationalized by our findings from the operating 
performance tests. With earlier tests, we showed that acquirers from regulatory mergers tended 
to experience abnormal advancements in both profitability and cost efficiency. Thus, positive 
results from event study indicate that public investors are indeed seeing such synergies and 
rewarding these mergers by bidding up the acquirers’ share price. 
[Insert Table 16 About Here] 
When separating first time failed bank auction participants (shown in Panel B) out from senior 
auction participants (shown in Panel C), we find that abnormal stock reaction is much higher for 
first time auction participants as compared to senior auction participants, 4.33% versus 2.44% 
over [0,+1] window. This is quite interesting because according to Zhang (1997), acquirer firms 
learn through experience. In particular, the author found that first time acquirers did not seem to 
benefit from acquiring failed banks from the FDIC. However, as they continue to participate in 
future auctions, their chance of improved abnormal returns is enhanced. Our results show exactly 
the opposite and we attribute this to our method applied for grouping first-time versus senior 
participants. In Zhang (1997), a bank is determined as either a first-time or an experienced failed 
bank auction participant based on whether or not it has acquired a peer bank through the failed 
bank auction before. In our study, we group banks based on whether or not it has participated in 
the failed bank auction before. For example, an acquirer who is a second-time failed bank 
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auction participant but a first-time failed bank auction winner would be classified into first-time 
experience group in Zhang (1997) but into senior experience group in our study. 
We propose that the Certification Effect could explain the difference between CARs in Panel B 
and C. For first time failed bank auction participants, investors rewarded the unsuccessful 
bidders for being invited by the FDIC to an auction, which signals their financial health. At the 
same time, investors rewarded the successful bidders first for being invited and second for 
having performance enhancing mergers. In other words, the first time unsuccessful bidders 
received the Certification Effect while the first time successful bidders received the Certification 
Effect plus the premium for a value-enhancing merger. In contrast, there is no Certification 
Effect for senior auction participants as this effect was received in an earlier auction. Thus, any 
abnormal improvements in performance are related to the merger effect and are felt only by the 
successful bidders. 
We check the robustness of the Certification Effect by examining the performance of the 
unsuccessful bidders following the announcement of their participation in the auction. According 
to our results from the operating performance tests (Table 9), these unsuccessful bidders failed to 
deliver abnormal operating performance advancements as compared to non-merger peers. This is 
not surprising because they did not actually have a merger after all. Accordingly, if the merger 
effect is the only determinant for market reactions we should also expect no event-specific 
abnormal reactions from the market. With this expectation, we conduct an event study analysis 
of the performance of the unsuccessful bidders. The results are reported in Table 17. Contrary to 
our expectations, the table shows that the first time participants who were unsuccessful bidders 
do indeed experience positive and significant returns during the announcement day and the day 
after. We suggest that these unsuccessful bidders are experiencing positive CARs because of the 
Certification Effect. 
[Insert Table 17 About Here] 
Following Cowan & Salotti (2013), we also perform a robustness check by extending the 
windows. Particularly, we change our estimation window to trading days [-345,-91], leaving 90 
trading days before the event date to avoid any abnormal market movements due to potential 
information leaks. Our event windows now are [-30,-1], [0,+1], [0,+2], and [+3,+30]. Results are 
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presented in Tables 18 and 19 respectively and they are generally consistent with the earlier tests. 
Sample sizes are slightly smaller due to a longer filtering window and the cases that are excluded 
are mainly from the group of senior failed bank auction participants. In regards to the winning 
bidders shown in Table 18, CARs are significantly positive, although a bit smaller than those in 
Table 16, over the window [0,+1] in all three panels and it is significantly higher for the group of 
first time failed bank auction participants compared to the senior group. Regarding unsuccessful 
bidders in Table 19, results are consistent except that now we have a positive reaction over [-30,-
1] window for the senior participants group shown in Panel C. We attribute this to the possible 
information leakage captured over a longer pre-merger window (there are no restrictions 
preventing unsuccessful bidders from disclosing the fact that they have participated in an auction 
once the official merger announcement is made by the FDIC) or potential bias due to a smaller 
sample size. 
[Insert Table 18 About Here] 
[Insert Table 19 About Here] 
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8. Conclusion 
The recent Global Financial Crisis provides a great opportunity to study regulatory mergers as 
the number of failed banks increases dramatically during financially turbulent periods. Unlike 
previous literature that take a more traditional approach, we adopt a more sophisticated method, 
Propensity Score Matching, along with traditional regression and event study methodologies to 
examine regulatory mergers and seek answers for how failed bank auction participants benefit 
from their participations. 
Results from both Propensity Score Matching and regression tests show that regulatory merger 
acquirers would experience real economic gains, or tangible benefits, in terms of both abnormal 
profitability and abnormal cost efficiency improvements while subsequent tests show that non-
regulatory merger acquirers would not. That being said, benefits of taking non-regulatory 
mergers, however, could be intangible, in aspects like becoming Too Big To Fail or simply 
gaining entrance to new markets at costs. We fail to find evidences supporting the argument that 
underpricing is a driven factor for outperformance of regulatory merger acquirers. However, this 
might be due to an imperfect estimation of merger price that we employ. Results also show that 
merger gains for regulatory merger acquirers tend to be higher for mergers done in later years of 
our study period, peaking at year of 2010. Results with unsuccessful bidders show that these 
banks did not have any operating benefits because of no merger involved. Results from event 
studies show that public investors tend to respond favorably for regulatory merger 
announcements. Sub-sample tests also show that public investors not only reward acquirers for 
their performance enhancing mergers, but also for being invited to a failed bank auction which 
signals their financial health, namely the Certification Effect. We also find that investors reward 
such certification only once and this is supported by results from event study tests on 
unsuccessful bidders.  
Our study contributes to the literature by providing additional knowledge on the FDIC failed 
bank mergers. We find a significant difference of post-merger operating performance of 
acquirers between regulatory mergers and non-regulatory mergers. We believe this is relevant 
and important information for bank managements. During a financial crisis, survivor banks are 
also in financial distress and in general would more likely have limited resources, which would 
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only allow them to initiate few M&As if any. Thus making a choice between two merger 
approaches, assuming underlying banks are invited to the FDIC’s closed auction, would be a 
very critical decision for bank managers to make and knowing the differences in possible 
outcomes in general as a guideline would help to improve managements’ decision making and 
ultimately improve banks’ capital utilization. Our study is also of interest to policy makers. The 
FDIC has been questioned for their private arrangement of failed banks and policy makers are 
looking for more information to understand if the FDIC has done an appropriate job in fairly and 
efficiently resolving failed banks. Our results do provide some insights showing that these 
regulatory mergers might create economic synergies for the acquirers and thus are a better way 
for the FDIC to resolve a failed bank as compared to the direct liquidation. 
Our findings from event studies also fill the gap of understanding the FDIC failed bank auctions 
and outcomes on different auction participants. We are the first to examine the Certification 
Effect and we believe that this would be very important knowledge for various parties, namely 
public investors, bank managements, and regulators and policy makers. Our findings could be 
served as an investment guideline for public investors in finding proper investment opportunities 
during financial turmoil. At the same time, knowing how public investors respond to the release 
of identifications of auction participants, bank management could use it as a financial tool just 
like a dividend or stock repurchase announcements to disseminate information about their 
financial health which lower the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. For 
example, bank management, if invited, could simply submit a bid, while aiming to actually win a 
case, to communicate with the public regarding their financial conditions. To regulators and 
policy makers, our study provides support for the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
amendments, showing that reducing the information gap between insiders and outsiders would 
enhance market efficiency. 
Our study in general also provides some other potential policy implications as well. For instance, 
countries including the U.S. are starting to implement the Basel III standard and two new 
financial instruments are introduced, namely the non-viability contingent capital and the bail-in 
debt. On one hand, applications of these two instruments will help to manage the capital 
adequacy and delay bank failures if not completely preventing it from happening. Therefore, it 
would reduce the chance of having the FDIC to step in and arrange for receivership, or at least 
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allow the FDIC more time to search for better options or deals that potentially lower the cost of 
resolving failed banks. However, on the other hand, the implementation of non-viability 
contingent capitals and bail-in debts could be very costly. The preferred share owners and bail-in 
debt creditors are ask to share significant amount of risks and in return will demand higher 
compensations. This will increase the cost of finance for banks in general and ultimately such 
costs will also be passed on to end customers. More importantly, such additional costs are 
inherent even when the economy is stable and sound. Therefore, questions like whether the cost 
of implementation of these financial tools will be lower than the cost of resolving failed banks 
through the current role of the FDIC have to be answered before we can conclude whether or not 
the FDIC should be discontinued from its current position. My study provides partial supports 
for the FDIC showing that private arrangement of failed banks through assistance of the FDIC 
seems to allow acquirer banks to achieve better operating performance by creating synergies. In 
other words, banking industry as a whole will benefit from the practice of allowing healthier 
peers to absorb failed banks in the long run and thus the role of the FDIC needs be in place to 
facilitate and monitor the process. 
Meanwhile, Canada also has its own version of the FDIC called the CDIC, which performs 
similar roles as the FDIC does in the United States. Although it seems that the Canadian banking 
industry was doing very well during the Global Financial Crisis without having a single financial 
institution failed, there were total of 43 failure cases handled by the CDIC since its inception. It 
is hard to comment on the role of the CDIC given the fact that there is no recent example to 
study with and no definite guideline of how the CDIC handles bank bankruptcy in Canada. 
However, our lesson from the FDIC might help the CDIC to improve its current system. For 
example, the implementation of auction in finding proper buyers and the application of the 
Purchase and Assumption (P&A) agreement might help the CDIC to reduce overall cost of 
resolving failed banks and save money from taxpayers. 
Despite the new contributions, many interesting questions need to be answered by future studies. 
First, studies could be done to investigate sources of profitability and cost efficiency 
improvement for regulatory mergers. Secondly, factors that drive non-regulatory mergers during 
Global Financial Crisis need to be discovered and examined to rationalize such big corporate 
decisions being made. Thirdly, future studies could also include multi-merger acquirers to reveal 
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if merger gains are increasing with the number of mergers and that would be an examination of 
the theory of learning by observing/practicing. Fourth, it will be also helpful to learn if the 
Certification Effect remains valid during periods of non-financial crisis.  
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Table 1 
Table 1             
Summary Statistics of All Banks Reported to the FDIC during 2003-2013   
Total Asset & Total Equity Summary Statistics 
    N Mean Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Banks with 
foreign office 
Total Assets 1,268 72,238 223,798 5.40 31.25 
Total Equity 1,268 7,529 21,483 5.31 31.16 
              
Banks without 
foreign office 
Total Assets 82,150 446 2,335 26.55 1049.95 
Total Equity 82,150 49 294 33.65 1753.85 
 
Extreme Observations for Total Assets 
  
 
With foreign office Without foreign office 
  
 
Lowest Highest Lowest Highest 
  
 
4.686 1,631,621 0.001 98,737 
  
 
58.042 1,746,242 0.066 99,877 
  
 
63.148 1,811,678 0.068 102,602 
  
 
63.256 1,896,773 0.207 142,616 
  
 
65.171 1,945,467 0.212 163,066 
  
 
Extreme Observations for Total Equity     
 
With foreign office Without foreign office     
 
Lowest Highest Lowest Highest     
 
-0.775 169,077 -63.11 14,288     
 
0.392 171,325 -40.551 14,916     
 
6.413 177,458 -36.66 15,672     
 
8.713 177,480 -23.388 23,327     
  8.997 178,693 -22.539 23,690     
1. Mean, standard deviation and extreme observations regarding total assets and total equities are 
stated in millions 
2. Sample size is based on company-year observations. For example, if a bank has financial 
information for 5 years, those are account as 5 individual observations in this table 
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Table 2 
Table 2a   
Variable Definition with Associated Call Report Items, form FFIEC 031 
   
Variable name Definition Call Report item, FFIEC 031 
   
RSSD ID Bank RSSD ID RSSD9001 
Reporting Type Filing Type RCON9804 
Date Reporting Date RSSD9999 
Size Log(total assets) log(RCFD2170) 
TA Total assets RCFD2170 
ROA Net income over lagged total 
assets 
RIAD4340/lrcfd2170 
CI Interest and noninterest 
expense over interest and 
noninterest income 
(RIAD4073+RIAD4093)/(RIAD4107+RIAD4079) 
IM Difference between interest 
rate on interest bearing assets 
and interest rate on interest 
bearing liabilities 
RIAD4107/(RCFD2170-(RCFD0081+RCFDB639))-
RIAD4073/(RCFD2950-
(RCON6631+RCFN6631+RCFD2930)) 
EQR Total equity over lagged total 
assets 
RCFD3210/lrcfd2170 
LQR Liquidity assets over lagged 
total assets 
(RCFD0010+RCONB987+RCFDB989+RCFD1754+
RCFD1773)/lrcfd2170 
NPL Non-performing loans over 
lagged total assets 
 
     a. loans past due 90 days 
or more 
 
         before 2007 RCON2769+RCON3494+RCON5399+RCONC237+
RCONC239+RCON3500+RCON3503+RCFNB573+
RCFD5378+RCFD5381+RCFD1597+RCFD1252+R
CFD1255+RCFDB576+RCFDB579+RCFD5390+RC
FD5460+RCFD1258+RCFD1272 
         between 2007 and 2010 RCON2769+RCON3494+RCON5399+RCONC237+
RCONC239+RCON3500+RCON3503+RCFNB573+
RCFD5378+RCFD5381+RCFD1597+RCFD1252+R
CFD1255+RCFDB576+RCFDB579+RCFD5390+RC
FD5460+RCFDF167+RCFDF170 
         after 2011 RCONF174+RCONF175+RCON3494+RCON5399+
RCONC237+RCONC239+RCON3500+RCONF180+
RCONF181+RCFNB573+RCFD5378+RCFD5381+R
CFD1597+RCFD1252+RCFD1255+RCFDB576+RC
FDK214+RCFDK217+RCFD5390+RCFD5460+RCF
DF167+RCFDF170 
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     b. nonaccrual loans  
         before 2007 RCON3492+RCON3495+RCON5400+RCONC229+
RCONC230+RCON3501+RCON3504+RCFNB574+
RCFD5379+RCFD5382+RCFD1583+RCFD1253+R
CFD1256+RCFDB577+RCFDB580+RCFD5391+RC
FD5461+RCFD1259+RCFD1791 
         between 2007 and 2010 RCON3492+RCON3495+RCON5400+RCONC229+
RCONC230+RCON3501+RCON3504+RCFNB574+
RCFD5379+RCFD5382+RCFD1583+RCFD1253+R
CFD1256+RCFDB577+RCFDB580+RCFD5391+RC
FD5461+RCFDF168+RCFDF171 
          after 2011 RCONF176+RCONF177+RCON3495+RCON5400+
RCONC229+RCONC230+RCON3501+RCONF182+
RCONF183+RCFNB574+RCFD5379+RCFD5382+R
CFD1583+RCFD1253+RCFD1256+RCFDB577+RC
FDK215+RCFDK218+RCFD5391+RCFD5461+RCF
DF168+RCFDF171 
Call Report form can be downloaded from FFIEC website at 
https://www.ffiec.gov/ffiec_report_forms.htm. Some items including ID, Date, and Reporting Type are 
with different item name in Call Report form and in SAS Call Report data file. In those cases, SAS Call 
Report data file is the primary source for final determination. Lag Total Assets is a custom definition and 
"lrcfd2170" means RCFD2170 from previous year (same for lrcon2170). 
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Table 3 
Table 2b   
Variable Definition with Associated Call Report Items, form FFIEC 041 
   
Variable name Definition Call Report item, FFIEC 041 
   
RSSD ID Bank RSSD ID RSSD9001 
Reporting Type Filing Type RCON9804 
Date Reporting Date RSSD9999 
Size Log(total assets) log(RCON2170) 
TA Total assets RCON2170 
ROA Net income over lagged total 
assets 
RIAD4340/lrcon2170 
CI Interest and noninterest 
expense over interest and 
noninterest income 
(RIAD4073+RIAD4093)/(RIAD4107+RIAD4079) 
IM Difference between interest 
rate on interest bearing assets 
and interest rate on interest 
bearing liabilities 
RIAD4107/(RCON2170-(RCON0081+RCONB639))-
RIAD4073/(RCON2950-(RCON6631+RCON2930)) 
EQR Total equity over lagged total 
assets 
RCON3210/lrcon2170 
LQR Liquidity assets over lagged 
total assets 
(RCON0010+RCONB987+RCONB989+RCON1754+
RCON1773)/lrcon2170 
NPL Non-performing loans over 
lagged total assets 
 
     a. loans past due 90 days or 
more 
 
         before 2007 RCON2769+RCON3494+RCON5399+RCONC237+R
CONC239+RCON3500+RCON3503+RCONB835+RC
ON1607+RCONB576+RCONB579+RCON5390+RCO
N5460+RCON1227 
         between 2007 and 2010 RCON2769+RCON3494+RCON5399+RCONC237+R
CONC239+RCON3500+RCON3503+RCONB835+RC
ON1607+RCONB576+RCONB579+RCON5390+RCO
N5460+RCON1227 
         after 2011 RCONF174+RCONF175+RCON3494+RCON5399+R
CONC237+RCONC239+RCON3500+RCONF180+RC
ONF181+RCONB835+RCON1607+RCONB576+RCO
NK214+RCONK217+RCON5390+RCON5460+RCO
N1227 
     b. nonaccrual loans  
50 
 
         before 2007 RCON3492+RCON3495+RCON5400+RCONC229+R
CONC230+RCON3501+RCON3504+RCONB836+RC
ON1608+RCONB577+RCONB580+RCON5391+RCO
N5461+RCON1228 
         between 2007 and 2010 RCON3492+RCON3495+RCON5400+RCONC229+R
CONC230+RCON3501+RCON3504+RCONB836+RC
ON1608+RCONB577+RCONB580+RCON5391+RCO
N5461+RCON1228 
          after 2011 RCONF176+RCONF177+RCON3495+RCON5400+R
CONC229+RCONC230+RCON3501+RCONF182+RC
ONF183+RCONB836+RCON1608+RCONB577+RCO
NK215+RCONK218+RCON5391+RCON5461+RCO
N1228 
Call Report form can be downloaded from FFIEC website at 
https://www.ffiec.gov/ffiec_report_forms.htm. Some items including ID, Date, and Reporting Type are 
with different item name in Call Report form and in SAS Call Report data file. In those cases, SAS Call 
Report data file is the primary source for final determination. Lag Total Assets is a custom definition and 
"lrcfd2170" means RCFD2170 from previous year (same for lrcon2170). 
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Table 4 
Table 2c 
Call Report Items Definition 
Item Definition 
RSSD9001 Bank RSSD ID 
RSSD9999 Reporting Date 
RCON9804 Financial Institution Filing Type 
RCFD0010 or RCON0010 Total Cash and Balances Due from Depository Institutions 
RCFD0081 or RCON0081 Noninterest-bearing balances due from depository institutions and currency and coin 
RCFD1252 Commercial and industrial loans to U.S. addressees (domicile) (Past due 90 days or 
more and still accruing) 
RCFD1253 Commercial and industrial loans to U.S. addressees (domicile) (Nonaccrual) 
RCFD1255 Commercial and industrial loans to non-U.S. addressees (domicile) (Past due 90 days 
or more and still accruing) 
RCFD1256 Commercial and industrial loans to non-U.S. addressees (domicile) (Nonaccrual) 
RCFD1258 Lease financing receivables of U.S. addressees (domicile) (Past due 90 days or more 
and still accruing) 
RCFD1259 Lease financing receivables of U.S. addressees (domicile) (Nonaccrual) 
RCFD1272 Lease financing receivables of non-U.S. addressees (domicile) (Past due 90 days or 
more and still accruing) 
RCFD1583 Loans to finance agricultural production and other loans to farmers (Nonaccrual) 
RCFD1597 Loans to finance agricultural production and other loans to farmers (Past due 90 days 
or more and still accruing) 
RCFD1754 or RCON1754 Held-to-maturity securities 
RCFD1773 or RCON1773 Available-for-sale securities 
RCFD1791 Lease financing receivables of non-U.S. addressees (domicile) (Nonaccrual) 
RCFD2170 or RCON2170 Total Asset 
RCFD2930 or RCON2930 Other liabilities 
RCFD2950 or RCON2950 Total liabilities 
RCFD3210 or RCON3210 Total bank equity capital 
RCFD5378 Loans to U.S. banks and other U.S. depository institutions (Past due 90 days or more 
and still accruing) 
RCFD5379 Loans to U.S. banks and other U.S. depository institutions (Nonaccrual) 
RCFD5381 Loans to foreign banks (Past due 90 days or more and still accruing) 
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RCFD5382 Loans to foreign banks (Nonaccrual) 
RCFD5390 or RCON5390 Loans to foreign governments and official institutions (Past due 90 days or more and 
still accruing) 
RCFD5391 or RCON5391 Loans to foreign governments and official institutions (Nonaccrual) 
RCFD5460 or RCON5460 All other loans (Past due 90 days or more and still accruing) 
RCFD5461 or RCON5461 All other loans (Nonaccrual) 
RCFDB576 or RCONB576 Loans to individuals for household, family, and other personal expenditures: Credit 
cards (Past due 90 days or more and still accruing) 
RCFDB577 or RCONB577 Loans to individuals for household, family, and other personal expenditures: Credit 
cards (Nonaccrual) 
RCFDB579 or RCONB579 Loans to individuals for household, family, and other personal expenditures: Other 
(includes single payment, installment, all student loans, and revolving credit plans 
other than credit cards) (Past due 90 days or more and still accruing) 
RCFDB580 or RCONB580 Loans to individuals for household, family, and other personal expenditures: Other 
(includes single payment, installment, all student loans, and revolving credit plans 
other than credit cards) (Nonaccrual) 
RCFDB639 or RCONB639 Total Trading assets 
RCFDB989 or RCONB989 Securities purchased under agreements to resell 
RCFDF167 Lease financing receivables to individuals for household, family, and other personal 
expenditures (Past due 90 days or more and still accruing) 
RCFDF168 Lease financing receivables to individuals for household, family, and other personal 
expenditures (Nonaccrual) 
RCFDF170 Lease financing receivables, all other leases (Past due 90 days or more and still 
accruing) 
RCFDF171 Lease financing receivables, all other leases (Nonaccrual) 
RCFDK214 or RCONK214 Loans to individuals for household, family, and other personal expenditures: 
Automobile loans (Past due 90 days or more and still accruing) 
RCFDK215 or RCONK215 Loans to individuals for household, family, and other personal expenditures: 
Automobile loans (Nonaccrual) 
RCFDK217 or RCONK217 Loans to individuals for household, family, and other personal expenditures: Other 
(revolving credit plans other than credit cards, and other consumer loans) (Past due 90 
days or more and still accruing) 
RCFDK218 or RCONK218 Loans to individuals for household, family, and other personal expenditures: Other 
(revolving credit plans other than credit cards, and other consumer loans) (Nonaccrual) 
RCFN6631 Noninterest-bearing deposits in foreign offices, Edge and Agreement subsidiaries 
RCFNB573 Loans secured by real estate in foreign offices (Past due 90 days or more and still 
accruing) 
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RCFNB574 Loans secured by real estate in foreign offices (Nonaccrual) 
RCON1227 Lease financing receivables (Past due 90 days or more and still accruing) 
RCON1228 Lease financing receivables (Nonaccrual) 
RCON1607 Commercial and industrial loans (Past due 90 days or more and still accruing) 
RCON1608 Commercial and industrial loans (Nonaccrual) 
RCON2769 Loans secured by construction, land development, and other land loans in domestic 
offices (Past due 90 days or more and still accruing) 
RCON3492 Loans secured construction, land development, and other land loans in domestic offices 
(Nonaccrual) 
RCON3494 Loans secured by farmland in domestic offices (Past due 90 days or more and still 
accruing) 
RCON3495 Loans secured by farmland in domestic offices (Nonaccrual) 
RCON3500 Loans secured by multifamily (5 or more) residential properties in domestic offices 
(Past due 90 days or more and still accruing) 
RCON3501 Loans secured by multifamily (5 or more) residential properties in domestic offices 
(Nonaccrual) 
RCON3503 Loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential properties in domestic offices (Past due 90 
days or more and still accruing) 
RCON3504 Loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential properties in domestic offices (Nonaccrual) 
RCON5399 Loans secured by 1– 4 family residential properties in domestic offices: (1) Revolving, 
open-end loans secured by 1– 4 family residential properties and extended under lines 
of credit (Past due 90 days or more and still accruing) 
RCON5400 Loans secured by 1– 4 family residential properties in domestic offices: (1) Revolving, 
open-end loans secured by 1– 4 family residential properties and extended under lines 
of credit (Nonaccrual) 
RCON6631 Noninterest-bearing deposits in domestic offices 
RCONB835 Loans to depository institutions and acceptances of other banks (Past due 90 days or 
more and still accruing) 
RCONB836 Loans to depository institutions and acceptances of other banks (Nonaccrual) 
RCONB987 Federal funds sold in domestic offices 
RCONC229 Loans secured by 1– 4 family residential properties in domestic offices: (2) Closed-end 
loans secured by 1– 4 family residential properties secured by first liens (Nonaccrual) 
RCONC230 Loans secured by 1– 4 family residential properties in domestic offices: (2) Closed-end 
loans secured by 1– 4 family residential properties secured by junior liens (Nonaccrual) 
RCONC237 Loans secured by 1– 4 family residential properties in domestic offices: (2) Closed-end 
loans secured by 1– 4 family residential properties secured by first liens (Past due 90 
days or more and still accruing) 
54 
 
RCONC239 Loans secured by 1– 4 family residential properties in domestic offices: (2) Closed-end 
loans secured by 1– 4 family residential properties secured by junior liens (Past due 90 
days or more and still accruing) 
RCONF174 Loans secured by construction, land development, and other land loans in domestic 
offices: (1) 1–4 family residential construction loans (Past due 90 days or more and 
still accruing) 
RCONF175 Loans secured by construction, land development, and other land loans in domestic 
offices: (2) Other construction loans and all land development and other land loans 
(Past due 90 days or more and still accruing) 
RCONF176 Loans secured by construction, land development, and other land loans in domestic 
offices: (1) 1–4 family residential construction loans (Nonaccrual) 
RCONF177 Loans secured by construction, land development, and other land loans in domestic 
offices: (1) Other construction loans and all land development and other land loans 
(Nonaccrual) 
RCONF180 Loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential properties in domestic offices: (1) Loans 
secured by owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential properties (Past due 90 days or 
more and still accruing) 
RCONF181 Loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential properties in domestic offices: (2) Loans 
secured by other nonfarm nonresidential properties (Past due 90 days or more and still 
accruing) 
RCONF182 Loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential properties in domestic offices: (1) Loans 
secured by owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential properties (Nonaccrual) 
RCONF183 Loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential properties in domestic offices: (2) Loans 
secured by other nonfarm nonresidential properties (Nonaccrual) 
RIAD4073 Total interest expense 
RIAD4079 Total noninterest income 
RIAD4093 Total noninterest expense 
RIAD4107 Total interest income 
RIAD4340 Net income (loss) 
Call Report form can be downloaded from FFIEC website at https://www.ffiec.gov/ffiec_report_forms.htm. Some 
items including ID, Date, and Reporting Type are with different item name in Call Report form and in SAS Call 
Report data file provided from above source. In those cases, SAS Call Report data file is the primary source for final 
determination. 
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Table 5 
Table 3a: Summary Statistics of Regulatory Merger Group in PSM Test  
Panel A: Acquirers and Targets, Year -2         
  Acquirers Targets 
Variable N Mean Median StdDev N Mean Median StdDev 
Size 67 527,893 260,139 718,566 67 273,599 98,286 859,509 
ROA 67 0.0263 0.0291 0.0318 65 -0.0254 -0.0174 0.0547 
CI 67 0.7763 0.7496 0.1306 67 1.0102 0.9557 0.4282 
IM 67 0.0859 0.0847 0.0231 67 0.0823 0.0823 0.0258 
EQR 67 0.1218 0.1103 0.0510 65 0.0998 0.0919 0.0422 
NPL 67 0.0124 0.0078 0.0162 65 0.0506 0.0416 0.0424 
LQR 67 0.2644 0.2393 0.1176 65 0.2237 0.1883 0.1690 
Panel B: Acquirers and Targets, Year -1         
Size 67 567,120 309,173 766,405 67 244,808 96,535 746,424 
ROA 67 0.0225 0.0268 0.0289 67 -0.1012 -0.0925 0.0993 
CI 67 0.7674 0.7344 0.1541 67 0.7156 1.1361 4.8415 
IM 67 0.0911 0.0880 0.0308 67 0.0814 0.0789 0.0309 
EQR 67 0.1166 0.1053 0.0408 67 0.0437 0.0331 0.0368 
NPL 67 0.0143 0.0104 0.0160 67 0.0845 0.0738 0.0637 
LQR 67 0.2857 0.2814 0.1274 67 0.1955 0.1618 0.1125 
Panel C: Acquirers, Year +1 
Size 67 746,443 425,708 1,050,832         
ROA 67 0.0264 0.0268 0.0264         
CI 67 0.6974 0.6882 0.1329         
IM 67 0.1019 0.0972 0.0211         
EQR 67 0.1080 0.1046 0.0238         
NPL 67 0.0251 0.0181 0.0226         
LQR 67 0.3152 0.3001 0.1305         
Panel D: Acquirers, Year +2 
Size 67 753,974 421,297 995,660         
ROAL 67 0.0262 0.0269 0.0238         
CI 67 0.6897 0.6898 0.1176         
IM 67 0.0956 0.0928 0.0187         
EQR 67 0.1116 0.1046 0.0236         
NPL 67 0.0187 0.0138 0.0219         
LQR 67 0.3311 0.3315 0.1298         
1. This table includes the M&As sample filtered for Propensity Score Matching. All cases remained are the ones 
such that this underlying merger transaction is associated acquirer's only transaction during the [-2Y,+2Y] 
window. All merger cases are aligned with merger year as Year 0. All mergers with missing value(s) for any of 
the variables listed will be excluded. 
2. Size here represents the absolute value of total assets in Thousands, even though natural logarithm of that 
value is used in Propensity Score Matching model  
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Table 6 
Table 3b: Summary Statistics of Non-regulatory Merger Group in PSM Test  
Panel A: Acquirers and Targets, Year -2         
  Acquirers Targets 
Variable N Mean Median StdDev N Mean Median StdDev 
Size 353 1,580,325 268,718 10,511,853 353 202,641 74,010 757,193 
ROA 351 0.0291 0.0280 0.0381 349 0.0292 0.0193 0.2850 
CI 353 0.7684 0.7551 0.1600 353 0.8641 0.8112 0.2697 
IM 353 0.0858 0.0852 0.0208 353 0.0849 0.0832 0.0235 
EQR 351 0.1146 0.1036 0.0499 349 0.1262 0.1020 0.0918 
NPL 351 0.0070 0.0044 0.0084 349 0.0101 0.0037 0.0166 
LQR 351 0.3106 0.2743 0.1831 349 0.3589 0.3300 0.1904 
Panel B: Acquirers and Targets, Year -1         
Size 353 1,700,904 298,289 11,493,103 353 205,988 75,567 738,078 
ROA 353 0.0262 0.0261 0.0329 353 0.0344 0.0157 0.4727 
CI 353 0.7722 0.7656 0.1048 353 0.8771 0.8308 0.2232 
IM 353 0.0838 0.0838 0.0212 353 0.0754 0.0800 0.1359 
EQR 353 0.1151 0.1038 0.0461 353 0.1234 0.1041 0.0745 
NPL 353 0.0087 0.0054 0.0110 353 0.0118 0.0045 0.0181 
LQR 353 0.3066 0.2758 0.1658 353 0.3498 0.3207 0.1809 
Panel C: Acquirers, Year +1 
Size 353 2,108,940 450,256 13,218,283         
ROA 353 0.0163 0.0217 0.0361         
CI 353 0.7834 0.7528 0.1738         
IM 353 0.0885 0.0865 0.0312         
EQR 353 0.1115 0.1061 0.0305         
NPL 353 0.0167 0.0105 0.0187         
LQR 353 0.3008 0.2722 0.1655         
Panel D: Acquirers, Year +2 
Size 353 2,106,243 456,273 13,127,927         
ROAL 353 0.0127 0.0197 0.0389         
CI 353 0.7804 0.7439 0.2049         
IM 353 0.0896 0.0885 0.0312         
EQR 353 0.1085 0.1054 0.0286         
NPL 353 0.0174 0.0106 0.0219         
LQR 353 0.3140 0.2778 0.1627         
1. This table includes the M&As sample filtered for Propensity Score Matching. All cases remained are the 
ones such that this underlying merger transaction is associated acquirer's only transaction during the [-
2Y,+2Y] window. All merger cases are aligned with merger year as Year 0. All mergers with missing value(s) 
for any of the variables listed will be excluded. 
2. Size here represents the absolute value of total assets in Thousands, even though natural logarithm of that 
value is used in Propensity Score Matching model  
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Table 7 
Table 3c: Summary Statistics of Unsuccessful Bidders in PSM Test 
Panel A: Unsuccessful Bidders, Year -2         
Variable N Mean Median StdDev         
Size 57 497,720 294,507 516,163         
ROA 57 0.0257 0.0271 0.0214         
CI 57 0.7780 0.7746 0.0958         
IM 57 0.0846 0.0839 0.0204         
EQR 57 0.1140 0.1044 0.0370         
NPL 57 0.0102 0.0058 0.0137         
LQR 57 0.2968 0.2818 0.1551         
Panel B: Unsuccessful Bidders, Year -1         
Size 57 530,726 322,527 546,217         
ROA 57 0.0233 0.0228 0.0165         
CI 57 0.7596 0.7436 0.0878         
IM 57 0.0854 0.0835 0.0182         
EQR 57 0.1106 0.1048 0.0263         
NPL 57 0.0110 0.0059 0.0133         
LQR 57 0.3254 0.2994 0.1539         
Panel C: Unsuccessful Bidders, Year +1 
Size 57 599,520 381,836 611,704         
ROA 57 0.0202 0.0223 0.0214         
CI 57 0.7340 0.7132 0.1101         
IM 57 0.0884 0.0872 0.0184         
EQR 57 0.1130 0.1081 0.0279         
NPL 57 0.0142 0.0079 0.0174         
LQR 57 0.3632 0.3504 0.1635         
Panel D: Unsuccessful Bidders, Year +2 
Size 57 616,605 395,101 617,753         
ROAL 57 0.0221 0.0235 0.0221         
CI 57 0.7294 0.7146 0.1252         
IM 57 0.0876 0.0848 0.0186         
EQR 57 0.1115 0.1036 0.0274         
NPL 57 0.0165 0.0072 0.0272         
LQR 57 0.3621 0.3344 0.1549     
1. This table includes all unsuccessful bidders filtered for Propensity Score Matching. All bidders remained are 
the ones with no merger transaction done within the [-2Y,+2Y] window. All bidders are aligned with bidding 
year as Year 0. All bidders with missing value(s) for any of the variables listed will be excluded. 
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Table 8 
Table 4 
                Results from Equality Test with [-2Y,+2Y] Window                     
                 Panel A: Equality Tests using pre-merger performance in Year -1 as benchmark 
  
Regulatory Merger Sample 
 
Non-regulatory Merger Sample 
  
ROA 
 
Cost-Income Ratio 
 
ROA 
 
Cost-Income Ratio 
# of 
years 
post-
merger 
Merger 
year 
Merger 
effects 
t value     
Merger 
effects 
t value     
Merger 
effects 
t 
value 
    
Merger 
effects 
t 
value 
  
1 yr 
2008 0.0001 0.01 
  
0.0040 0.04 
  
-0.0043 -0.95 
  
0.0156 0.67 
 
2009 0.0288 2.69 *** -0.0903 -3.60 *** 0.0002 0.03 
  
-0.0337 -1.74 * 
2010 0.0369 5.13 *** -0.0798 -0.30 
  
0.0040 0.77 
  
-0.0266 -0.90 
 
2011 0.0455 2.72 ** 
 
-0.2507 -2.65 *** 0.0023 0.79 
  
-0.0238 -1.81 * 
                 
2 yr 
2008 0.0014 0.05 
  
0.0135 0.14 
  
0.0012 0.39 
  
-0.0308 -3.06 *** 
2009 0.0187 1.66 * 
 
-0.0803 -2.28 ** 
 
-0.0030 -0.44 
  
-0.0317 -1.00 
 
2010 0.0348 5.22 *** -0.0682 -0.32 
  
0.0006 0.10 
  
-0.0058 -0.21 
 
2011 0.0494 3.56 *** -0.2763 -3.68 *** 0.0025 0.84 
  
-0.0146 -1.07 
 
Panel B: Equality Tests using average of pre-merger performance in Year -1 & -2 as benchmark 
  
Regulatory Merger Sample 
 
Non-regulatory Merger Sample 
  
ROA 
 
Cost-Income Ratio 
 
ROA 
 
Cost-Income Ratio 
# of 
years 
post-
merger 
Merger 
year 
Merger 
effects 
t value     
Merger 
effects 
t value     
Merger 
effects 
t 
value 
    
Merger 
effects 
t 
value 
  
1 yr 
2008 0.0007 0.03 
  
0.0372 0.40 
  
-0.0058 -1.26 
  
0.0604 2.32 *** 
2009 0.0172 2.55 ** 
 
-0.0454 -1.99 * 
 
-0.0036 -0.46 
  
-0.0079 -0.32 
 
2010 0.0277 4.80 *** -0.0593 -0.45 
  
0.0034 0.71 
  
-0.0145 -0.42 
 
2011 0.0354 2.88 *** -0.1557 -2.12 ** 
 
0.0017 0.68 
  
0.0132 0.43 
 
                 
2 yr 
2008 0.0019 0.08 
  
0.0466 0.56 
  
-0.0003 -0.09 
  
0.0140 0.98 
 
2009 0.0071 0.65 
  
-0.0354 -1.05 
  
-0.0069 -0.77 
  
-0.0058 -0.16 
 
2010 0.0257 4.82 *** -0.0477 -0.38 
  
0.0000 0.01 
  
0.0063 0.18 
 
2011 0.0393 3.10 *** -0.1813 -3.44 *** 0.0019 0.75 
  
0.0224 0.73 
 
1. This table includes the M&As sample filtered for Propensity Score Matching. All cases remained are the ones such that this 
underlying merger transaction is associated acquirer's only transaction during the [-2Y,+2Y] window. Merger effects are 
calculated by subtracting non-merger group's statistics from merger group's statistics.  
2. Significance level is determined by comparing above t values to 2-tail critical t values. ***, **, and * denote respectively 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Table 9 
Table 5 
Results from PSM with [-2Y,+2Y] Window, Nearest Neighbor plus Radius (0.0001) Matching  
Panel A: Propensity Score Matching using pre-merger performance in Year -1 as benchmark 
 
Regulatory merger 
 
Non-regulatory merger 
  
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
  
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
# of years 
post-merger 
N 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
 
N 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
1yr 51 0.0220 2.97 *** -0.2147 -3.54 *** 
 
216 0.0012 0.43 
 
-0.0012 -0.09 
 
2yr 51 0.0244 3.36 *** -0.2359 -4.00 *** 
 
216 0.0016 0.56 
 
-0.0134 -1.07 
 
                
Panel B: Propensity Score Matching using average of pre-merger performance in Year -1 & -2 as benchmark 
 
Regulatory merger 
 
Non-regulatory merger 
  
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
  
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
# of years 
post-merger 
N 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
 
N 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
1yr 56 0.0152 2.05 ** -0.1987 -4.30 *** 
 
211 0.0007 0.24 
 
-0.0119 -0.67 
 
2yr 56 0.0105 1.44 
 
-0.1715 -3.89 *** 
 
211 0.0009 0.30 
 
-0.0281 -1.66 * 
1. This table includes the M&As sample filtered for Propensity Score Matching. All cases remained are the ones such that this 
underlying merger transaction is associated acquirer's only transaction during the [-2Y,+2Y] window. Merger effects are 
calculated by subtracting non-merger group's statistics from merger group's statistics. This is performed with nearest neighbor 
plus radius (0.0001) matching strategies. 
2. Propensity Score Matching performed here are using Stata program "pscore" patch 2 developed by Sascha O. Becker and 
Andrea Ichino. More information can be found at http://www.sobecker.de/ 
3. Significance level is determined by comparing above t values to 2-tail critical t values. ***, **, and * denote respectively 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
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Table 10 
Table 6 
          
Pairwise Test for PSM with [-2Y,+2Y] Window, Nearest Neighbor plus Radius (0.0001) Matching   
Panel A: PSM test using pre-merger performance in Year -1 as benchmark 
Variables 
 
Regulatory Merger 
 
Non-regulatory Merger 
  
N Treated Match Difference 
 
N Treated Match Difference 
Size 
 
51 12.7150 12.7634 -0.0483 
 
216 12.5801 12.5834 -0.0033 
     
-0.33 
    
-0.12 
ROA 
 
51 -0.0038 0.0026 -0.0064 
 
216 0.0206 0.0178 0.0027 
     
-0.88 
    
0.77 
CI 
 
51 0.9243 0.8040 0.1204 
 
216 0.8025 0.8068 -0.0043 
     
1.90* 
    
-0.35 
IM 
 
51 0.0880 0.0949 -0.0069 
 
216 0.0837 0.0787 0.0050 
     
-0.74 
    
1.46 
EQR 
 
51 0.0966 0.0983 -0.0018 
 
216 0.1155 0.1200 -0.0045 
     
-0.32 
    
-0.85 
NPL 
 
51 0.0288 0.0294 -0.0006 
 
216 0.0115 0.0105 0.0010 
     
-0.15 
    
0.89 
LQR 
 
51 0.2787 0.2671 0.0116 
 
216 0.3232 0.3065 0.0167 
     
0.44 
    
0.85 
Panel B: PSM test using average of pre-merger performance in Year -1 & -2 as benchmark 
  
Regulatory Merger 
 
Non-regulatory Merger 
  
N Treated Match Difference 
 
N Treated Match Difference 
Size 
 
56 12.8196 12.5274 0.2922 
 
211 12.5179 12.4916 0.0263 
     
2.19** 
    
0.99 
ROA 
 
56 0.0050 -0.0067 0.0118 
 
211 0.0203 0.0175 0.0027 
     
2.11** 
    
1.24 
CI 
 
56 0.8635 0.8766 -0.0131 
 
211 0.8051 0.8109 -0.0058 
     
-0.35 
    
-0.43 
IM 
 
56 0.0898 0.0847 0.0051 
 
211 0.0838 0.0849 -0.0011 
     
0.88 
    
-0.31 
EQR 
 
56 0.1031 0.0954 0.0077 
 
211 0.1153 0.1123 0.0029 
     
1.67 
    
0.73 
NPL 
 
56 0.0266 0.0301 -0.0036 
 
211 0.0104 0.0104 0.0000 
     
-1.16 
    
0.01 
LQR 
 
56 0.2635 0.2446 0.0190 
 
211 0.3210 0.3137 0.0073 
     
0.77 
    
0.48 
1. We perform the pairwise test on all pairs determined using PSM with nearest neighbor matching plus radius (0.0001) matching 
strategies. Propensity Score Matching is performed on the sample filtered in the way that all cases remained are the ones such 
that this underlying merger transaction is associated acquirer's only transaction during the [-2Y,+2Y] window. Each pair in this 
sample consists one merger bank and its matching bank and both banks are from the same year. Thus, we combine all the pairs 
from individual PSM tests for year 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 into one master list. 
2. Significance level is determined by comparing above t values to 2-tail critical t values. ***, **, and * denote respectively 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Table 11 
Table 7 
                Results from PSM with [-2Y,+2Y] Window, Nearest Neighbor plus Radius (0.0001) Matching 
Panel A: Propensity Score Matching using pre-merger performance in Year -1 as benchmark 
  
Regulatory merger 
 
Non-regulatory merger 
   
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
  
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
# of 
years 
post-
merger 
Merger 
year 
N 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
 
N 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
1 yr 
2008 4 0.0110 0.50 
 
-0.0350 -0.28 
  
79 0.0050 0.98 
 
0.0140 0.53 
 
2009 13 0.0260 2.32 ** -0.0730 -1.72 
  
52 0.0060 0.74 
 
-0.0350 -1.18 
 
2010 22 0.0300 2.58 ** -0.3200 -2.39 ** 
 
31 -0.0090 -1.21 
 
0.0220 0.56 
 
2011 12 0.0120 0.63 
 
-0.2200 -2.84 ** 
 
54 0.0000 -0.09 
 
-0.0040 -0.21 
 
                 
2 yr 
2008 4 0.0390 1.24 
 
-0.0040 -0.04 
  
79 0.0060 1.50 
 
-0.0200 -1.10 
 
2009 13 0.0230 1.36 
 
-0.0780 -1.31 
  
52 0.0030 0.33 
 
-0.0240 -0.76 
 
2010 22 0.0300 2.53 ** -0.3510 -2.65 ** 
 
31 -0.0110 -1.27 
 
-0.0090 -0.19 
 
2011 12 0.0130 0.81 
 
-0.2570 -4.65 *** 
 
54 0.0030 0.59 
 
0.0000 -0.02 
 
Panel B: Propensity Score Matching using average of pre-merger performance in Year -1 & -2 as benchmark 
  
Regulatory merger 
 
Non-regulatory merger 
   
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
  
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
# of 
years 
post-
merger 
Merger 
year 
N 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
 
N 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
1 yr 
2008 4 -0.0010 -0.05 
 
0.0750 0.69 
  
80 -0.0070 -1.16 
 
0.0400 1.32 
 
2009 17 0.0150 2.00 * -0.1930 -2.40 ** 
 
50 0.0050 0.86 
 
-0.0360 -0.72 
 
2010 21 0.0170 1.06 
 
-0.2080 -2.59 ** 
 
30 -0.0010 -0.09 
 
-0.0170 -0.35 
 
2011 14 0.0230 1.29 
 
-0.2620 -2.52 ** 
 
51 0.0070 1.74 
 
-0.0640 -2.36 ** 
                 
2 yr 
2008 4 -0.0040 -0.28 
 
0.0520 0.63 
  
80 -0.0020 -0.50 
 
-0.0100 -0.58 
 
2009 17 0.0000 0.03 
 
-0.1030 -1.64 
  
50 0.0080 0.97 
 
-0.0310 -0.60 
 
2010 21 0.0090 0.61 
 
-0.1910 -2.50 ** 
 
30 -0.0090 -0.93 
 
0.0130 0.24 
 
2011 14 0.0330 1.83 * -0.2760 -2.85 ** 
 
51 0.0080 1.56 
 
-0.0850 -2.35 ** 
1. This table includes the M&As sample filtered for Propensity Score Matching. All cases remained are the ones such that this 
underlying merger transaction is associated acquirer's only transaction during the [-2Y,+2Y] window. Merger effects are 
calculated by subtracting non-merger group's statistics from merger group's statistics. This is performed with nearest neighbor 
plus radius (0.0001) matching strategies. 
2. Propensity Score Matching performed here are using Stata program "pscore" patch 2 developed by Sascha O. Becker and 
Andrea Ichino. More information can be found at http://www.sobecker.de/ 
3. Significance level is determined by comparing above t values to 2-tail critical t values. ***, **, and * denote respectively 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Table 12 
Table 8 
Results from Propensity Score Matching with [-2Y,+2Y] Window, Radius Matching (0.0001) 
Panel A: Propensity Score Matching using pre-merger performance in Year -1 as benchmark 
  
Regulatory Merger Sample 
 
Non-regulatory Merger Sample 
   
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
 
 
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
# of 
years 
post-
merger 
Merger 
year 
N 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
  
N 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
1 yr 
2008 4 0.0010 0.04 
 
0.0090 0.09 
 
 
79 0.0000 0.12 
 
0.0100 0.42 
 
2009 13 0.0260 3.43 *** -0.1170 -3.41 *** 
 
52 0.0030 0.48 
 
-0.0290 -1.40 
 
2010 22 0.0380 4.68 *** -0.2760 -2.13 ** 
 
31 -0.0020 -0.58 
 
-0.0600 -0.64 
 
2011 12 0.0300 2.36 ** -0.1640 -2.36 ** 
 
54 0.0030 0.90 
 
-0.0210 -1.56 
 
         
 
       
2 yr 
2008 4 0.0040 0.27 
 
0.0190 0.22 
 
 
79 0.0050 1.80 * -0.0330 -2.78 *** 
2009 13 0.0150 1.47 
 
-0.0810 -2.02 * 
 
52 0.0000 -0.05 
 
-0.0190 -0.76 
 
2010 22 0.0380 4.52 *** -0.3110 -2.44 ** 
 
31 -0.0060 -1.07 
 
-0.0120 -0.31 
 
2011 12 0.0370 3.95 *** -0.2160 -4.41 *** 
 
54 0.0040 1.25 
 
-0.0260 -1.94 * 
Panel B: Propensity Score Matching using average of pre-merger performance in Year -1 & -2 as benchmark 
  
Regulatory Merger Sample 
 
Non-regulatory Merger Sample 
   
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
 
 
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
# of 
years 
post-
merger 
Merger 
year 
N 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
  
N 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
1 yr 
2008 4 0.0030 0.19 
 
-0.0030 -0.03 
 
 
80 -0.0040 -0.77 
 
0.0300 1.09 
 
2009 17 0.0200 3.47 *** -0.1050 -3.90 *** 
 
50 0.0050 1.22 
 
-0.0080 -0.29 
 
2010 21 0.0250 3.83 *** -0.1790 -2.46 ** 
 
30 -0.0030 -0.59 
 
0.0030 0.11 
 
2011 14 0.0340 2.71 ** -0.1860 -2.70 ** 
 
51 0.0030 0.96 
 
-0.0240 -1.44 
 
         
 
       
2 yr 
2008 4 0.0050 0.36 
 
0.0020 0.03 
 
 
80 0.0010 0.27 
 
-0.0270 -2.31 ** 
2009 17 0.0060 0.67 
 
-0.0630 -1.91 * 
 
50 0.0040 1.03 
 
-0.0540 -0.77 
 
2010 21 0.0230 3.67 *** -0.2560 -3.30 *** 
 
30 -0.0070 -1.19 
 
0.0170 0.45 
 
2011 14 0.0380 4.19 *** -0.2190 -4.75 *** 
 
51 0.0040 1.43 
 
-0.0290 -1.81 * 
1. This table includes the M&As sample filtered for Propensity Score Matching. All cases remained are the ones such that this 
underlying merger transaction is associated acquirer's only transaction during the [-2Y,+2Y] window. Merger effects are 
calculated by subtracting non-merger group's statistics from merger group's statistics. This is performed with radius matching 
strategy with 0.0001 radius set. 
2. Propensity Score Matching performed here are using Stata program "pscore" patch 2 developed by Sascha O. Becker and 
Andrea Ichino. More information can be found at http://www.sobecker.de/ 
3. Significance level is determined by comparing above t values to 2-tail critical t values. ***, **, and * denote respectively 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Table 13 
Table 9 
               Results with [-2Y,+2Y] Window for Unsuccessful Bidders, Radius Matching (0.0001)   
 
               Panel A: Equality Test Results 
  
with Year -1 as Benchmark with Average of Year -1 and -2 as Benchmark 
   
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
 
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
# of years 
post-
merger 
Merger 
year 
  
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value   
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
1 yr 
2009 
 
-0.0113 -2.26 ** 0.0211 1.08 
  
-0.0118 -2.27 ** 0.0496 2.38 ** 
2010 
 
-0.0069 -1.96 * -0.0151 -0.55 
  
-0.0075 -1.93 * 0.0041 0.15 
 
2011 
 
-0.0035 -1.47 
 
0.0137 0.80 
  
-0.0002 -0.05 
 
0.0342 0.98 
 
                
2yr 
2009 
 
-0.0140 -2.10 ** 0.0060 0.16 
  
-0.0145 -2.09 ** 0.0345 0.90 
 
2010 
 
-0.0052 -1.89 * -0.0001 -0.01 
  
-0.0058 -2.23 ** 0.0191 0.99 
 
2011 
 
-0.0060 -1.98 * 0.0278 1.48 
  
-0.0027 -0.63 
 
0.0483 1.33 
 
                
Panel B: Propensity Score Matching Results 
  
with Year -1 as Benchmark with Average of Year -1 and -2 as Benchmark 
   
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
 
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
# of years 
post-
merger 
Merger 
year 
N 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value N 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
1 yr 
2009 20 -0.0070 -1.34 
 
0.0060 0.32 
 
20 -0.0050 -0.96 
 
-0.0010 -0.06 
 
2010 21 -0.0020 -0.66 
 
-0.0050 -0.24 
 
19 -0.0030 -0.72 
 
-0.0030 -0.14 
 
2011 12 0.0000 -0.16 
 
0.0140 0.65 
 
13 0.0000 0.06 
 
0.0040 0.15 
 
                
2yr 
2009 20 -0.0080 -1.19 
 
-0.0560 -0.67 
 
20 -0.0070 -1.03 
 
-0.0050 -0.16 
 
2010 21 0.0010 0.18 
 
-0.0140 -0.79 
 
19 0.0010 0.43 
 
-0.0150 -0.68 
 
2011 12 0.0000 -0.08 
 
0.0280 1.25 
 
13 -0.0010 -0.28 
 
0.0080 0.28 
 
                                
1. This table includes the M&As sample filtered for Propensity Score Matching. All cases included here are with acquirers whose 
[-2Y,+2Y] window is clean from mergers. Merger effects are calculated by subtracting non-merger group's statistics from merger 
group's statistics. This is performed with radius matching strategy with 0.0001 radius set. 
2. Propensity Score Matching performed here are using Stata program "pscore" patch 2 developed by Sascha O. Becker and 
Andrea Ichino. More information can be found at http://www.sobecker.de/ 
3. Significance level is determined by comparing above t values to 2-tail critical t values. ***, **, and * denote respectively 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Table 14 
Table 10 
              
Results from Equality Test with [-3Y,+3Y] Window                   
Panel A: Equality Tests using pre-merger performance in Year -1 as benchmark 
  
Regulatory merger 
 
Non-regulatory merger  
  
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
 
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
# of years 
post-merger 
Merger 
year 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value   
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
1 yr 
2008 0.0001 0.00 
 
0.0039 0.04 
  
-0.0018 -0.41 
 
0.0052 0.25 
 
2009 0.0281 2.35 ** -0.0781 -2.72 *** 
 
-0.0001 -0.01 
 
-0.0399 -1.87 * 
2010 0.0353 4.98 *** -0.0583 -0.20 
  
0.0053 1.02 
 
-0.0327 -1.12 
 
               
2 yr 
2008 0.0013 0.05 
 
0.0133 0.13 
  
0.0003 0.10 
 
-0.0318 -3.37 *** 
2009 0.0170 1.37 
 
-0.0586 -1.53 
  
-0.0021 -0.23 
 
-0.0439 -1.34 
 
2010 0.0329 5.08 *** -0.0401 -0.17 
  
0.0002 0.03 
 
-0.0056 -0.20 
 
               
3 yr 
2008 -0.0081 -0.30 
 
0.0844 0.67 
  
0.0008 0.33 
 
-0.0526 -2.15 ** 
2009 0.0164 1.27 
 
-0.0388 -1.20 
  
0.0004 0.05 
 
-0.0389 -1.44 
 
2010 0.0304 4.08 *** -0.0162 -0.07 
  
0.0072 0.87 
 
-0.0195 -0.97 
 
Panel B: Equality Tests using average of pre-merger performance in Year -1, -2 & -3 as benchmark 
  
Regulatory merger 
 
Non-regulatory merger  
  
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
 
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
# of years 
post-merger 
Merger 
year 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value   
Merger 
effects 
t value   
Merger 
effects 
t value 
1 yr 
2008 -0.0007 -0.03 
 
0.0709 0.87 
  
-0.0035 -0.74 
 
0.0750 2.95 *** 
2009 0.0160 2.44 ** -0.0255 -0.94 
  
-0.0051 -0.52 
 
0.0090 0.29 
 
2010 0.0211 4.37 *** -0.0128 -0.10 
  
0.0026 0.76 
 
0.0108 0.30 
 
               
2 yr 
2008 0.0005 0.02 
 
0.0801 1.16 
  
-0.0014 -0.38 
 
0.0378 2.46 *** 
2009 0.0049 0.41 
 
-0.0060 -0.15 
  
-0.0072 -0.67 
 
0.0053 0.13 
 
2010 0.0187 4.15 *** 0.0055 0.05 
  
-0.0025 -0.43 
 
0.0380 1.02 
 
               
3 yr 
2008 -0.0089 -0.40 
 
0.1513 1.32 
  
-0.0010 -0.41 
 
0.0172 0.64 
 
2009 0.0043 0.67 
 
0.0137 0.41 
  
-0.0047 -0.45 
 
0.0097 0.27 
 
2010 0.0162 3.08 *** 0.0293 0.24     0.0045 0.86   0.0240 0.79   
1. This table includes the M&As sample filtered for Propensity Score Matching. All cases remained are the ones such that this 
underlying merger transaction is associated acquirer's only transaction during the [-3Y,+3Y] window. Merger effects are 
calculated by subtracting non-merger group's statistics from merger group's statistics.  
2. Significance level is determined by comparing above t values to 2-tail critical t values. ***, **, and * denote respectively 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Table 15 
Table 11 
Results from Propensity Score Matching with [-3Y,+3Y] Window, Radius Matching (0.0001) 
Panel A: Propensity Score Matching using pre-merger performance in Year -1 as benchmark 
  
Regulatory merger 
 
Non-regulatory merger 
   
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
  
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
# of years 
post-
merger 
Merger 
year 
N 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value   N 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
1 yr 
2008 4 0.0010 0.04 
 
0.0080 0.08 
  
73 0.0020 0.67 
 
-0.0060 -0.36 
 
2009 12 0.0270 4.37 *** -0.1150 -3.37 *** 
 
46 0.0100 2.08 ** -0.0410 -1.82 * 
2010 20 0.0350 4.33 *** -0.2640 -1.87 * 
 
26 -0.0010 -0.40 
 
-0.0050 -0.22 
 
                 
2 yr 
2008 4 0.0040 0.29 
 
0.0180 0.21 
  
73 0.0040 1.56 
 
-0.0460 -4.52 *** 
2009 12 0.0170 2.17 * -0.0670 -1.67 
  
46 0.0080 1.72 * -0.1980 -2.47 ** 
2010 20 0.0330 4.25 *** -0.2700 -2.02 * 
 
26 -0.0070 -1.27 
 
0.0090 0.30 
 
                 
3 yr 
2008 4 -0.0040 -0.32 
 
0.1080 0.87 
  
73 0.0040 1.50 
 
-0.0380 -3.16 *** 
2009 12 0.0140 2.25 ** -0.0650 -1.78 
  
46 0.0080 1.43 
 
-0.0430 -1.41 
 
2010 20 0.0320 3.60 *** -0.2580 -1.89 * 
 
26 -0.0020 -0.58 
 
-0.0110 -0.49 
 
Panel B: Propensity Score Matching using average of pre-merger performance in Year -1, -2 & -3 as benchmark 
  
Regulatory merger 
 
Non-regulatory merger 
   
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
  
ROA Cost-Income Ratio 
# of years 
post-
merger 
Merger 
year 
N 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value   N 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
Merger 
effects 
t value 
1 yr 
2008 4 0.0010 0.10 
 
0.0040 0.05 
  
69 0.0000 -0.02 
 
0.0120 0.46 
 
2009 16 0.0200 3.58 *** -0.1140 -4.13 *** 
 
47 0.0070 1.43 
 
0.0130 0.38 
 
2010 19 0.0230 4.16 *** -0.1570 -2.78 ** 
 
26 0.0030 0.69 
 
-0.0160 -0.50 
 
                 
2 yr 
2008 4 0.0050 0.46 
 
0.0120 0.17 
  
69 0.0040 0.86 
 
-0.0370 -3.14 *** 
2009 16 0.0090 1.15 
 
-0.0840 -2.39 ** 
 
47 0.0050 1.01 
 
0.0180 0.50 
 
2010 19 0.0200 3.48 *** -0.1800 -3.23 *** 
 
26 -0.0040 -0.64 
 
0.0070 0.17 
 
                 
3 yr 
2008 4 -0.0040 -0.30 
 
0.1010 0.90 
  
69 0.0050 2.06 ** -0.0430 -3.40 *** 
2009 16 0.0060 1.15 
 
-0.1100 -2.05 * 
 
47 0.0050 1.01 
 
-0.0040 -0.10 
 
2010 19 0.0160 2.40 ** -0.1520 -2.73 ** 
 
26 0.0010 0.23 
 
-0.0100 -0.29 
 
1. This table includes the M&As sample filtered for Propensity Score Matching. All cases remained are the ones such that this 
underlying merger transaction is associated acquirer's only transaction during the [-3Y,+3Y] window. Merger effects are 
calculated by subtracting non-merger group's statistics from merger group's statistics. This is performed with radius matching 
strategy with 0.0001 radius set. 
2. Propensity Score Matching performed here are using Stata program "pscore" patch 2 developed by Sascha O. Becker and 
Andrea Ichino. More information can be found at http://www.sobecker.de/ 
3. Significance level is determined by comparing above t values to 2-tail critical t values. ***, **, and * denote respectively 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
  
66 
 
Table 16 
Table 12 
    
Regression (3) Results With All Acquirer Banks And Their Matching Banks   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
ΔROA_+1Y ΔROA_+2Y ΔCI_+1Y ΔCI_+2Y 
     
Reg_Merger 0.0153*** 0.0154*** -0.1899*** -0.2132*** 
 
(3.20) (3.06) (-3.58) (-4.16) 
Nonreg_Merger -0.0005 0.0013 -0.0134 -0.0285** 
 
(-0.18) (0.45) (-0.98) (-2.35) 
Premerger_Size -0.0032* -0.0036* 0.0013 -0.0030 
 
(-1.83) (-1.73) (0.20) (-0.39) 
Premerger_ROA 
  
1.6315** 1.4631** 
   
(2.22) (2.02) 
Premerger_CI 0.0699*** 0.0627** 
  
 
(2.82) (2.44) 
  
Premerger_IM 0.1114 0.0082 -0.0883 0.3705 
 
(0.97) (0.06) (-0.31) (1.07) 
Premerger_EQR -0.0766 -0.0668 -0.5197** -0.7174*** 
 
(-1.01) (-0.74) (-2.05) (-3.69) 
Premerger_NPL 0.1711 0.2539* 2.4882*** 2.3162*** 
 
(1.32) (1.83) (3.01) (3.16) 
Premerger_LQR 0.0310** 0.0134 -0.0033 0.0595 
 
(2.30) (0.86) (-0.05) (1.04) 
Constant -0.0278 -0.0041 -0.0337 -0.0167 
 
(-0.60) (-0.08) (-0.38) (-0.16) 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 534 534 534 534 
R-sq 0.3676 0.3028 0.1967 0.2037 
Note: Sample consists all regulatory and non-regulatory merger acquirer banks and their 
matching banks from Panel A Table 5. ΔROA_+1Y (ΔCI_+1Y) stands for ROA (CI) change of a 
bank between Year -1 and Year +1, ΔROA_+2Y (ΔCI_+2Y) stands for ROA (CI) change of a 
bank between Year -1 and Year +2, Reg_Merger is a dummy variable that takes 1 if a bank is a 
regulatory merger acquirer and 0 otherwise, Nonreg_Merger is a dummy variable that takes 1 if a 
bank is a non-regulatory merger acquirer and 0 otherwise, Premerger_Xs are 6 dimensions (Size, 
IM, EQR, NPL, LQR and either ROA or CI depending on the dependent variable used) of a bank 
in Year -1, and Year_Controls are a set of year dummies. The number reported on the same line 
as the parameter name is the coefficient and the number reported below is the robust t statistics. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, the 5%, and the 1% level, respectively, 
using a two-tail test. 
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Table 17 
Table 13 
    Regression (3) Results With All Regulatory Merger Acquirer Banks And Their Matching Banks 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
ΔROA_+1Y ΔROA_+2Y ΔCI_+1Y ΔCI_+2Y 
     Reg_Merger 0.0175*** 0.0209*** -0.1967*** -0.2202*** 
 
(2.98) (2.94) (-3.60) (-3.87) 
Premerger_Size -0.0086** -0.0069* -0.0281 -0.0504 
 
(-2.29) (-1.83) (-0.81) (-1.43) 
Premerger_ROA 
  
3.4259 3.0526 
   
(1.45) (1.23) 
Premerger_CI 0.0483** 0.0384** 
  
 
(2.52) (2.06) 
  Premerger_IM 0.3537*** 0.2961*** 0.1031 0.3927 
 
(4.32) (3.46) (0.19) (0.56) 
Premerger_EQR -0.2014 -0.1610 -2.0056** -2.3620*** 
 
(-1.22) (-0.98) (-2.47) (-2.78) 
Premerger_NPL 0.2613 0.3157 3.7781* 3.0222 
 
(1.19) (1.32) (1.87) (1.61) 
Premerger_LQR 0.0446* 0.0379 0.1611 0.1435 
 
(1.68) (1.05) (0.96) (0.86) 
Constant 0.0480 0.0343 0.3807 0.7058 
 
(0.83) (0.62) (0.85) (1.55) 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 102 102 102 102 
R-sq 0.4901 0.4311 0.2643 0.2679 
Note: Sample consists all regulatory merger acquirer banks and their matching banks from Panel 
A Table 5. ΔROA_+1Y (ΔCI_+1Y) stands for ROA (CI) change of a bank between Year -1 and 
Year +1, ΔROA_+2Y (ΔCI_+2Y) stands for ROA (CI) change of a bank between Year -1 and 
Year +2, Reg_Merger is a dummy variable that takes 1 if a bank is a regulatory merger acquirer 
and 0 otherwise, Nonreg_Merger is a dummy variable that takes 1 if a bank is a non-regulatory 
merger acquirer and 0 otherwise, Premerger_Xs are 6 dimensions (Size, IM, EQR, NPL, LQR 
and either ROA or CI depending on the dependent variable used) of a bank in Year -1, and 
Year_Controls are a set of year dummies. The number reported on the same line as the parameter 
name is the coefficient and the number reported below is the robust t statistics. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, the 5%, and the 1% level, respectively, using a two-tail test. 
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Table 18 
Table 14 
List of All Merger Transactions Included In Equation 6.4 with Equity Discount and Competition Information 
Merger 
date 
Acquirer 
ID 
Target 
ID 
Assets 
Discount 
Deposit 
Premium 
# of 
bidders 
# of 
bids 
BV of 
Equity 
-1Q 
Sale 
Price 
of 
Equity 
Equity 
Discount 
Equity 
Discount 
% 
20090703 368933 152048 -1620 2.00% 5 5 -848 -3084 -2236 -7.44% 
20090703 490535 223238 -2965 4.10% 6 6 1389 -4248 -5637 -8.10% 
20090703 552732 542537 -2495 1.00% 3 3 864 -2112 -2976 -5.41% 
20090703 800134 732945 -4327 2.00% 1 1 -392 -6217 -5825 -7.79% 
20090703 1157415 3194179 -49000 0.00% 1 2 742 -48258 -49000 -41.31% 
20090711 903950 558257 0 0.00% 1 1 3101 3101 0 0.00% 
20090724 292908 3380066 -800 0.00% 5 5 -685 -1485 -800 -1.44% 
20090801 2686211 2538842 -17783 0.00% 3 6 1675 -16108 -17783 -10.89% 
20090905 698957 880659 -6600 0.00% 3 3 309 -6291 -6600 -41.98% 
20091107 751852 182157 -9975 0.00% 1 1 -875 -10850 -9975 -37.11% 
20100116 746157 197357 -3490 0.00% 3 3 -1219 -4709 -3490 -15.24% 
20100123 474759 740258 0 0.59% 1 1 -272 -392 -120 -0.59% 
20100130 922559 978051 -140 7.35% 4 4 2269 -1962 -4231 -7.23% 
20100220 643452 749550 0 0.51% 6 8 4229 3978 -251 -0.47% 
20100227 2349301 3437081 -2571 0.00% 1 1 889 -1683 -2572 -5.03% 
20100320 625757 143653 -2015 0.50% 1 2 325 -1829 -2154 -7.65% 
20100320 541231 314033 -14000 0.00% 1 1 2824 -11176 -14000 -10.21% 
20100320 436131 3426245 -14000 0.00% 2 2 2282 -11718 -14000 -14.50% 
20100501 756848 222053 -7.78% 0.00% 1 1 814 -3249 -4063 -7.78% 
20100508 787459 730754 -6150 0.02% 6 12 -100 -6256 -6156 -19.24% 
20100508 3131400 3257047 -18.40% 0.30% 1 1 479 -21985 -22464 -18.68% 
20100515 2390929 2902041 -10.50% 0.00% 2 2 117 -11558 -11675 -10.50% 
20100522 457752 3234598 -11625 1.33% 3 5 -446 -12846 -12400 -20.26% 
20100605 703039 85043 -12.99% 0.00% 1 1 -3178 -11030 -7852 -12.99% 
20100626 771458 2799803 -15.16% 0.00% 2 2 -735 -12915 -12180 -15.16% 
20100724 1016259 2451 -5900 0.00% 2 2 167 -5733 -5900 -20.89% 
20100724 906063 20866 -17500 1.05% 2 2 7954 -11939 -19893 -7.94% 
20100724 3400928 3023701 -14000 0.00% 1 1 1538 -12462 -14000 -6.87% 
20101002 972769 2847900 -10800 0.25% 1 1 1131 -9896 -11027 -11.86% 
20101023 423739 219138 0 0.05% 1 1 310 297 -13 -0.05% 
20101023 2805441 761178 -12426 0.00% 1 1 473 -11953 -12426 -13.10% 
20101120 678717 2830135 -5931 0.50% 2 3 1474 -4917 -6391 -6.00% 
20110129 18854 54357 -22995 0.00% 1 1 3261 -19734 -22995 -51.62% 
20110129 663647 117841 -30794 0.00% 3 8 265 -30529 -30794 -12.78% 
20110212 532042 216445 -21499 0.00% 1 1 1770 -19729 -21499 -25.65% 
69 
 
20110312 454658 949257 0.00% 7.50% 9 9 7305 2180 -5125 -5.68% 
20110326 2970657 2568120 -23400 0.10% 1 1 695 -22866 -23561 -14.45% 
20110709 444556 3264782 -24440 0.00% 2 3 1550 -22890 -24440 -39.09% 
20110730 3153288 3390702 -23756 0.00% 3 3 499 -23257 -23756 -28.45% 
20110820 189745 3020193 -38303 0.00% 1 1 3143 -35161 -38304 -27.16% 
20111015 890742 2869180 -21500 0.00% 1 1 -6583 -28083 -21500 -11.02% 
20111111 2921211 3350779 -8492 0.00% 1 1 1364 -7128 -8492 -13.61% 
20111119 783246 106546 -15500 0.00% 6 7 1507 -13993 -15500 -16.93% 
20111217 3696936 3469448 -12100 0.00% 3 5 -1079 -13179 -12100 -9.61% 
Average 
  
-10429 0.66% 2 3 916 -11269 -12185 -14.77% 
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Table 19 
Table 15 
    Regression (4) Results With All Regulatory Merger Acquirer Banks And Their Matching Banks 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Outperform_ROA_+1Y Outperform_ROA_+2Y Outperform_CI_+1Y Outperform_CI_+2Y 
     
Equity_Discount -0.0299 0.0559 0.6486 0.4561 
 
(-0.44) (0.90) (0.98) (0.70) 
Competition 0.0028 0.0040 0.0266 0.0117 
 
(1.11) (1.38) (1.38) (0.58) 
Size_Diff -0.0416*** -0.0288*** -0.3361 -0.3820* 
 
(-3.79) (-3.46) (-1.49) (-1.81) 
ROA_Diff 
  
7.0720* 5.8391* 
   
(1.97) (1.70) 
CI_Diff 0.0443*** 0.0281*** 
  
 
(5.39) (3.58) 
  
IM_Diff 0.1090 0.0972 -2.8560 -2.3226 
 
(0.72) (0.65) (-1.32) (-1.15) 
EQR_Diff 0.3096 0.3346 2.5544 1.7132 
 
(1.21) (1.27) (0.79) (0.57) 
NPL_Diff -0.7869** -0.5424** -4.0601 -5.4415 
 
(-2.06) (-2.07) (-0.80) (-1.15) 
LQR_Diff 0.0245 0.0033 -0.1893 -0.1012 
 
(0.52) (0.07) (-0.38) (-0.22) 
Constant 0.0025 0.0148 -0.2124* -0.2352** 
 
(0.20) (1.03) (-2.02) (-2.39) 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 44 44 44 44 
R-sq 0.5574 0.4148 0.4770 0.4798 
Note: Sample consists all regulatory merger acquirer banks and their matching banks from Panel A Table 5, except 7 cases which 
we fail to obtain auction bid summary information to form Competition variable. We combine each acquirer bank observation 
with the observation of its matching bank to form measurements of differences and our dependent variable becomes a difference-
in-difference measurement, the same as the merger effect from earlier PSM tests. Outperform_ROA_+1Y (Outperform_CI_+1Y) 
stands for the difference in ROA (CI) change from Year -1 to Year +1 between an acquirer bank and its matching bank, 
Outperform_ROA_+2Y (Outperform_CI_+2Y) stands for the difference in ROA (CI) change from Year -1 to Year +2 between 
an acquirer bank and its matching bank, Equity_Discount is the difference between sale price of Equity and last reported book 
value of Equity of the target that underlying acquirer bank purchased scaled by last reported book value of Assets of the target, 
Competition is the average between number of bidders and number of bids in a failed bank auction, Xs_Diff are differences 
between an acquirer bank and its matching bank in 6 dimensions (Size, IM, EQR, NPL, LQR and either ROA or CI depending on 
the dependent variable used) in Year -1, and Year_Controls are a set of year dummies. The number reported on the same line as 
the parameter name is the coefficient and the number reported below is the robust t statistics. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, the 5%, and the 1% level, respectively, using a two-tail test. 
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Table 20 
Table 16 
     FDIC failed-bank auctions: winning bidders' abnormal returns 
 Event Date: merger announcement date       
Window N Mean CAR 
Median 
CAR 
Positive: 
Negative 
Z test, 
bootstrapped 
 
     
Panel A: Full sample 
[-10,-3] 94 -1.25% -1.55% 35:59 -1.92 
[-2,-1] 94 -0.08% -0.10% 45:49 -0.25 
[0,+1] 94 3.53% 1.80% 66:28 4.37*** 
[0,+2] 94 3.88% 2.40% 65:29 4.15*** 
[+3,+10] 94 0.01% -0.34% 46:48 0.01 
 
     
Panel B: First time failed bank auction participants 
  
[-10,-3] 54 -1.50% -1.68% 20:34 -1.51 
[-2,-1] 54 0.21% 0.40% 30:24 0.37 
[0,+1] 54 4.33% 2.74% 37:17 4.97*** 
[0,+2] 54 4.38% 3.60% 38:16 3.89*** 
[+3,+10] 54 -0.49% -1.68% 22:32 -0.47 
 
     
Panel C: Senior failed bank auction participants 
  
[-10,-3] 40 -0.92% -1.41% 15:25 -1.18 
[-2,-1] 40 -0.46% -0.35% 15:25 -0.72 
[0,+1] 40 2.44% 0.92% 29:11 4.18*** 
[0,+2] 40 3.19% 1.41% 27:13 2.75*** 
[+3,+10] 40 0.68% 0.51% 24:16 1.01 
1. We took the merger announcement (close) date from regulatory merger as day 0. For each bank in our 
sample, we estimated a standard OLS market model using data of period from -270th trading day to -21st 
trading day so that we have approximately included one year of market data. We left 20 trading days 
between the estimation window of the market model and day 0 to avoid any abnormal market movements 
due to potential information leak. We performed our market reaction test over five event windows: [-10,-
3], [-2,-1], [0,+1], [0,+2], and [+3,+10]. We cleaned our sample based on the rule that underlying merger 
bank will not have a second merger activity, neither regulatory nor non-regulatory merger, for the entire 
period from -270th trading day to +10th trading day. We, however, did include merger cases from same 
acquirer as long as these following mergers were closed within half a year (roughly 125 trading days) of 
the first merger but at least 10 trading days apart from earlier transaction. For these successive merger 
cases included, their estimation window took the announcement date of the first case in the series as day 0 
(in other words, they were sharing the same estimated market model), and their event window took the 
actual announcement date of their own as day 0. 
2. Statistical test is with robust standard errors control and bootstrapping. Significance level is determined 
by comparing above t values to 2-tail critical t values. ***, **, and * denote respectively significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Table 21 
Table 17 
     FDIC failed-bank auctions: Unsuccessful bidders' abnormal returns  
Event Date: bid summary release date     
Window N Mean CAR 
Median 
CAR 
Positive: 
Negative 
Z test, 
bootstrapped 
Panel A: full sample         
[-10,-3] 80 -0.72% -0.79% 36:44 -0.73 
[-2,-1] 80 0.32% -0.04% 40:40 1.09 
[0,+1] 80 0.27% 0.08% 41:39 0.73 
[0,+2] 80 0.16% -0.04% 39:41 0.38 
[+3,+10] 79 -0.32% 0.31% 42:37 -0.57 
            
Panel B: First time failed bank auction participants     
[-10,-3] 19 -2.03% -0.44% 9:10 -0.89 
[-2,-1] 19 -0.46% -0.49% 7:12 -0.94 
[0,+1] 19 1.41% 0.29% 12:7 1.72* 
[0,+2] 19 0.88% 0.43% 10:9 0.92 
[+3,+10] 19 1.11% 0.31% 10:9 1.1 
            
Panel C: Senior failed bank auction participants     
[-10,-3] 61 -0.31% -1.08% 27:34 -0.37 
[-2,-1] 61 0.56% 0.13% 33:28 1.59 
[0,+1] 61 -0.08% -0.14% 29:32 -0.26 
[0,+2] 61 -0.07% -0.09% 29:32 -0.18 
[+3,+10] 60 -0.77% 0.36% 32:28 -1.00 
1. We took the bid summary release date from regulatory merger as day 0. For each bank in our sample, 
we estimated a standard OLS market model using data of period from -270th trading day to -21st trading 
day so that we have approximately included one year of market data. We left 20 trading days between the 
estimation window of the market model and day 0 to avoid any abnormal market movements due to 
potential information leak. We performed our market reaction test over five event windows: [-10,-3], [-2,-
1], [0,+1], [0,+2], and [+3,+10]. We cleaned our sample based on the rule that underlying unsuccessful 
bidder bank will not have any merger activity, neither regulatory nor non-regulatory merger, for the entire 
period from -270th trading day to +10th trading day. We, however, did include bidding disclosure from 
same bank as long as these following bids were disclosed within half a year (roughly 125 trading days) of 
the first bid disclosure or merger activities but at least 10 trading days apart from earlier one. For these 
successive bidding disclosures included, their estimation window took the announcement date of the first 
case in the series as day 0 (in other words, they were sharing the same estimated market model), and their 
event window took the actual announcement date of their own as day 0. 
2. Statistical test is with robust standard errors control and bootstrapping. Significance level is determined 
by comparing above t values to 2-tail critical t values. ***, **, and * denote respectively significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Table 22 
Table 18 
     FDIC failed-bank auctions: winning bidders' abnormal returns 
Event Date: merger announcement date     
Window N Mean CAR 
Median 
CAR 
Positive: 
Negative 
Z test, 
bootstrapped 
      
Panel A: Full sample 
[-30,-1] 87 -1.73% 0.44% 48:39 -1.34 
[0,+1] 87 2.92% 1.52% 59:28 3.83*** 
[0,+2] 87 3.13% 1.54% 57:30 3.55*** 
[+3,+30] 87 -0.25% 1.33% 51:36 -0.19 
      
Panel B: First time failed bank auction participants 
[-30,-1] 53 -1.66% 1.41% 33:20 -1.08 
[0,+1] 53 3.95% 1.84% 38:15 3.34*** 
[0,+2] 53 3.71% 2.42% 37:16 3.34*** 
[+3,+30] 53 -0.96% 0.70% 30:23 -0.44 
      
Panel C: Senior failed bank auction participants 
[-30,-1] 34 -1.83% -1.33% 15:19 -1.26 
[0,+1] 34 1.32% 0.30% 21:13 1.81* 
[0,+2] 34 2.23% 0.38% 20:14 2.04** 
[+3,+30] 34 0.86% 1.86% 21:13 0.59 
1. We took the merger announcement (close) date from regulatory merger as day 0. For each 
bank in our sample, we estimated a standard OLS market model using data of period from -
345th trading day to -91st trading day so that we have approximately included one year of 
market data. We left 90 trading days between the estimation window of the market model and 
day 0 to avoid any abnormal market movements due to potential information leak. We 
performed our market reaction test over four event windows: [-30,-1], [0,+1], [0,+2], and 
[+3,+30]. We cleaned our sample based on the rule that underlying merger bank will not have 
a second merger activity, neither regulatory nor non-regulatory merger, for the entire period 
from -345th trading day to +30th trading day. 
2. Statistical test is with robust standard errors control and bootstrapping. Significance level is 
determined by comparing above t values to 2-tail critical t values. ***, **, and * denote 
respectively significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Table 23 
Table 19 
     FDIC failed-bank auctions: Unsuccessful bidders' abnormal returns   
Event Date: bid summary release date 
Window N Mean CAR 
Median 
CAR 
Positive: 
Negative 
Z test, 
bootstrapped 
            
Panel A: Full sample  
[-30,-1] 49 0.52% 1.84% 27:22 0.51 
[0,+1] 49 0.57% 0.21% 27:22 1.28 
[0,+2] 49 -0.01% 0.15% 26:23 -0.02 
[+3,+30] 49 0.58% -0.63% 22:27 0.5 
            
Panel B: First time failed bank auction participants   
[-30,-1] 20 -0.96% 2.59% 13:7 -0.47 
[0,+1] 20 1.69% 0.97% 13:7 1.74* 
[0,+2] 20 1.00% 0.40% 11:9 0.79 
[+3,+30] 20 3.35% 2.83% 13:7 1.45 
            
Panel C: Senior failed bank auction participants  
[-30,-1] 29 1.91% 2.40% 15:14 1.8* 
[0,+1] 29 -0.09% -0.01% 14:15 (-0.20) 
[0,+2] 29 -0.38% 0.20% 16:13 (-0.57) 
[+3,+30] 29 -1.04% -1.05% 10:19 (-1.08) 
1. We took the bid summary release date from regulatory merger as day 0. For each bank in our 
sample, we estimated a standard OLS market model using data of period from -345th trading day 
to -91st trading day so that we have approximately included one year of market data. We left 90 
trading days between the estimation window of the market model and day 0 to avoid any 
abnormal market movements due to potential information leak. We performed our market 
reaction test over four event windows: [-30,-1], [0,+1], [0,+2], and [+3,+30]. We cleaned our 
sample based on the rule that underlying unsuccessful bidder bank will not have any merger 
activity, neither regulatory nor non-regulatory merger, for the entire period from -345th trading 
day to +30th trading day. 
2. Statistical test is with robust standard errors control and bootstrapping. Significance level is 
determined by comparing above t values to 2-tail critical t values. ***, **, and * denote 
respectively significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1
An Example of A Failed Bank Auction Bid Summary
Marshall Bank, N.A., Hallock, MN
Closing Date: January 29, 2010
Bidder Type of Transaction
Deposit 
Premium/(Di
scount) %
Asset 
Premium/(Di
scount) 
$(000 ) / %
SF Loss 
Share 
Tranche 1
SF Loss 
Share 
Tranche 2
SF Loss 
Share 
Tranche 3
Commercial 
Loss Share 
Tranche 1
Commercial 
Loss Share 
Tranche 2
Commercial 
Loss Share 
Tranche 3
Winning bid and bidder:
United Valley Bank, Cavalier, ND
Cover (second place):Frandsen 
Bank and Trust, Lonsdale, MN
All deposit modified whole bank 
with loss share
1.32% ($267) 80% 95% N/A 80% 95% N/A
Other Bid All deposit modified whole bank 
with loss share
1.05% ($690) 80% 95% N/A 80% 95% N/A
Other Bid All deposit modified whole bank 
with loss share
0.00% ($4,500) 80% 95% N/A 80% 95% N/A
Other Bidder Names:
Citizens State Bank of Roseau, Roseau, MN
Crookston National Bank, Crookston, MN
Notes:
- The Other Bidder Names and the Other Bids are in random order. There is no linkage between bidder names and bids, except in the case of the winning bid. 
All deposit modified whole bank 
with loss share
7.35% ($140) 80% 95% N/A
- The winning bidder's acquisition of all the deposits was the least costly resolution compared to a liquidation alternative. The liquidation alternative was valued using valuation models to estimate the 
market value of the assets. Bids for loss share, if any, were valued using a discounted cash flow analysis for the loss share portfolio over the life of the loss share agreement. If any bids were received that 
would have been more costly than liquidation they have been excluded from this summary.
80% 95% N/A
